Today's Message Index:
----------------------
1. 04:52 AM - Complex aircraft NTSB report (Sam Hoskins)
2. 06:12 AM - Re: Battery Proximity and mounting (Bob Lee)
3. 07:07 AM - Re: First choice alternator decision (Speedy11@aol.com)
4. 07:19 AM - Re: First choice alternator decision (Speedy11@aol.com)
5. 07:31 AM - Re: Re: First choice alternator decision (Hinde, Frank George (Corvallis))
6. 07:31 AM - Re: Battery Proximity and mountingIn my opinion (Speedy11@aol.com)
7. 07:38 AM - Re: Battery Proximity and mounting (Speedy11@aol.com)
8. 08:03 AM - Re: Re: Battery Proximity and mounting (Hinde, Frank George (Corvallis))
9. 08:34 AM - Re: Re: Battery Proximity and mounting (Ed Anderson)
10. 09:43 AM - Re: Battery Proximity and mounting (Robert L. Nuckolls, III)
11. 10:07 AM - Re: Magneto Switch Rating (Robert L. Nuckolls, III)
12. 10:19 AM - Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report (Robert L. Nuckolls, III)
13. 10:45 AM - Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report (Hinde, Frank George (Corvallis))
14. 10:51 AM - Re: Battery Proximity and mounting ()
15. 11:27 AM - Re: Magneto Switch Rating (marcausman)
16. 12:14 PM - Re: Battery Proximity and mounting (Bob Lee)
17. 12:32 PM - Re: Battery Proximity and mounting (Robert L. Nuckolls, III)
18. 01:03 PM - Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report (bcollinsmn)
19. 01:18 PM - Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report (Ernest Christley)
20. 02:38 PM - Re: Battery Proximity and mounting (Robert L. Nuckolls, III)
21. 02:59 PM - Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report (Robert L. Nuckolls, III)
22. 03:10 PM - Re: Re: Magneto Switch Rating (Robert L. Nuckolls, III)
23. 03:11 PM - Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report (Matt Prather)
24. 03:26 PM - Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report (Rob Housman)
25. 03:48 PM - Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report (Bob Collins)
26. 03:52 PM - Re: Battery Proximity and mounting (Bob Lee)
27. 04:44 PM - 12 vs. 24 volt system (Giffen Marr)
28. 04:51 PM - Splicing into D-sub wires. (Sam Hoskins)
29. 07:39 PM - Re: Re: Magneto Switch Rating (Vern Little)
30. 08:29 PM - Re: Re: Magneto Switch Rating (Robert L. Nuckolls, III)
31. 08:31 PM - Re: 12 vs. 24 volt system (Robert L. Nuckolls, III)
32. 09:12 PM - Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report (Kelly McMullen)
33. 10:53 PM - COAXIAL CABLES recommendations (Thruster87)
34. 11:04 PM - Re: Dual mags now...one Plasma II plus later (Ed Holyoke)
Message 1
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| Subject: | Complex aircraft NTSB report |
All,
I found this link on the rotary engine news group. It's a thorough NTSB
report about a complex engine/electrical installation that the builder/pilot
was unwilling and unprepared to finish correctly.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id 071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&akey=1
Sam
Message 2
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| Subject: | Battery Proximity and mounting |
Bob,
In the "Battery Proximity and mounting" thread speaking of Z-14 you say:
Z-14 is the "mother of all electrical systems" intended
to address the design goals for probably less than 1%
of the OBAM aircraft fleet. This would be the Lancair
or Glasair with fully redundant IFR panels on both
pilot seats wherein the aircraft's missions often
include two rated pilots and a high percentage of
flight in IMC.
...
Z-13/8 will keep them all humming
at much less cost and weight in your airplane . . .
and easier to install too.
In the "First choice alternator decision" thread you say:
The purpose of this little dissertation is to suggest
that much of what's reported as an "alternator
problem" has nothing to do with the design or
fabricating processes in the alternator itself.
I have decided on Z-14 to support my electrically dependant engine because
of your second statement! I'm not concerned with battery failure, I'm
concerned with my ability to assemble a set of components, few as they are,
that will not fail in any circumstance. The Z-14 design is more reliable
than Z-13/8 by a significant margin because all of us do not have your
capability to assemble the compenents. Two battery ground connections and
two battery plus connections are a great sleeping aid to me. I'm using
smaller batteries so the weight penalty is only a few pounds.
Regards,
Bob Lee
N52BL KR2
Suwanee, GA USA
92% done only 67% to go!
Message 3
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| Subject: | Re: First choice alternator decision |
In hindsight, I, too, should have given more consideration to the 40 A
unit. As I was building, my thought was that more power was better. While
that is basically true, during my building process, new technology low power
replacements for traditionally high power gadgets became available - such
as HIDs for incandescent landing lights, LEDs for position, taxi (landing?)
lights and interior lights, low power EFIS and engine monitors. As a
result, my power needs are dramatically less than what the alternator can
produce. I guess the PP 60A will just be loafing.
Stan Sutterfield
As we speak, I am doing a load analysis to determine if I even need a 60
amp alternator. Maybe I can get away with a 40 amp and shed 2.5 lb. and
$200.
**************Make your summer sizzle with fast and easy recipes for the
grill. (http://food.aol.com/grilling?ncid=emlcntusfood00000006)
Message 4
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| Subject: | Re: First choice alternator decision |
Bob's point is very well taken. I would guess that his observation that
most aircraft alternator "failures" are not necessarily alternator related,
but rather failures of the methods used to connect them to the electrical
system is correct.
His advice for separate LV detection is wise.
Stan Sutterfield
Do not archive
Observance of those design goals calls for active
notification of low voltage that is independent
of the alternator and it's regulator.
**************Make your summer sizzle with fast and easy recipes for the
grill. (http://food.aol.com/grilling?ncid=emlcntusfood00000006)
Message 5
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| Subject: | Re: First choice alternator decision |
Hmm..Yes the PP 60A would be hard pressed to find any real work to do..But
then its a very small lightweight unit so I don't see that it matters. Is t
here a 40A unit with the same reliability and shutdown features that is 2.5
lb less than the Plane power?
Frank
________________________________
From: owner-aeroelectric-list-server@matronics.com [mailto:owner-aeroelectr
ic-list-server@matronics.com] On Behalf Of Speedy11@aol.com
Sent: Friday, June 26, 2009 7:04 AM
Subject: AeroElectric-List: Re: First choice alternator decision
In hindsight, I, too, should have given more consideration to the 40 A unit
. As I was building, my thought was that more power was better. While tha
t is basically true, during my building process, new technology low power r
eplacements for traditionally high power gadgets became available - such as
HIDs for incandescent landing lights, LEDs for position, taxi (landing?) l
ights and interior lights, low power EFIS and engine monitors. As a result
, my power needs are dramatically less than what the alternator can produce
. I guess the PP 60A will just be loafing.
Stan Sutterfield
As we speak, I am doing a load analysis to determine if I even need a 60
amp alternator. Maybe I can get away with a 40 amp and shed 2.5 lb. and
$200.
________________________________
Make your summer sizzle with fast and easy recipes<http://food.aol.com/gril
ling?ncid=emlcntusfood00000006> for the grill.
Message 6
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| Subject: | Re: Battery Proximity and mountingIn my opinion |
In my opinion, the reasons you stated are not sufficient to warrant
carrying around - for the lifetime of your airplane - and additional 15-20 Lbs
of
weight. The maintenance benefit is important, but doesn't require two
batteries. Simply change out your single battery each year. As far as
additional cranking power, I don't think you'll need it. I'm using only one of
my two P680s to crank my IO-390 (with slightly higher than normal
compression) and it spins over rapidly and starts easily.
Thus, I would not use those arguments as justification for installing two
batteries.
FYI, I decided to install two batteries for the following reasons:
1. To have a completely redundant backup electrical system for use in IFR
flight
2. To power airplane gadgets during start that are not happy with power
fluctuations
3. To shift CG aft
My airplane weighed in 20 Lbs heavier than desired - the weight of one
extra battery and bracket.
Stan Sutterfield
Do not archive
I intend to use to use two batteries for the maintenance benefits you
outline in your book and for the additional cranking power.
**************Make your summer sizzle with fast and easy recipes for the
grill. (http://food.aol.com/grilling?ncid=emlcntusfood00000006)
Message 7
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| Subject: | Re: Battery Proximity and mounting |
Concur 100%.
I may remove my extra battery in the future.
Stan Sutterfield
Do not archive
Unless you have operational features that
encourage dual batteries, please consider installing
a single 17 to 18 a.h. RG battery. You can always
up-size later. But consider leaving 16 pounds of
hardware on the ground until you KNOW you need it.
16 extra pounds of baggage or fuel is USEFUL . . . 16
unnecessary pounds of battery is . . . well . . .
you know.
I'm betting you'll never need it.
**************Make your summer sizzle with fast and easy recipes for the
grill. (http://food.aol.com/grilling?ncid=emlcntusfood00000006)
Message 8
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| Subject: | Re: Battery Proximity and mounting |
Yup I agree..I have a 7a with dual El s and electric fuel pumps only (no me
chanical pump). Its flys in IMC.
I have a single battery and an SD8 backup alternator and it has proven perf
ectly adequate.
Frank
________________________________
From: owner-aeroelectric-list-server@matronics.com [mailto:owner-aeroelectr
ic-list-server@matronics.com] On Behalf Of Speedy11@aol.com
Sent: Friday, June 26, 2009 7:37 AM
Subject: AeroElectric-List: Re: Battery Proximity and mounting
Concur 100%.
I may remove my extra battery in the future.
Stan Sutterfield
Do not archive
Unless you have operational features that
encourage dual batteries, please consider installing
a single 17 to 18 a.h. RG battery. You can always
up-size later. But consider leaving 16 pounds of
hardware on the ground until you KNOW you need it.
16 extra pounds of baggage or fuel is USEFUL . . . 16
unnecessary pounds of battery is . . . well . . .
you know.
I'm betting you'll never need it.
________________________________
Make your summer sizzle with fast and easy recipes<http://food.aol.com/gril
ling?ncid=emlcntusfood00000006> for the grill.
Message 9
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| Subject: | Re: Battery Proximity and mounting |
Agree. I flew for 4 years with two Odyssey PC 680 batteries and never used
the second one except for assisting to crank on a cold morning. Finally
removed the second one and have now been flying 6 years with just one
battery. I do change it out every two years and stick the old one in my
lawn tractor.
Ed
Ed Anderson
Rv-6A N494BW Rotary Powered
Matthews, NC
eanderson@carolina.rr.com
<http://www.andersonee.com> http://www.andersonee.com
<http://www.dmack.net/mazda/index.html>
http://www.dmack.net/mazda/index.html
http://www.flyrotary.com/
<http://members.cox.net/rogersda/rotary/configs.htm>
http://members.cox.net/rogersda/rotary/configs.htm#N494BW
http://www.rotaryaviation.com/Rotorhead%20Truth.htm
<http://www.dmack.net/mazda/index.html>
_____
From: owner-aeroelectric-list-server@matronics.com
[mailto:owner-aeroelectric-list-server@matronics.com] On Behalf Of
Speedy11@aol.com
Sent: Friday, June 26, 2009 10:37 AM
Subject: AeroElectric-List: Re: Battery Proximity and mounting
Concur 100%.
I may remove my extra battery in the future.
Stan Sutterfield
Do not archive
Unless you have operational features that
encourage dual batteries, please consider installing
a single 17 to 18 a.h. RG battery. You can always
up-size later. But consider leaving 16 pounds of
hardware on the ground until you KNOW you need it.
16 extra pounds of baggage or fuel is USEFUL . . . 16
unnecessary pounds of battery is . . . well . . .
you know.
I'm betting you'll never need it.
_____
Make your summer sizzle with fast and easy
<http://food.aol.com/grilling?ncid=emlcntusfood00000006> recipes for the
grill.
__________ Information from ESET NOD32 Antivirus, version of virus signature
database 3267 (20080714) __________
The message was checked by ESET NOD32 Antivirus.
Message 10
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| Subject: | Battery Proximity and mounting |
I have decided on Z-14 to support my electrically dependant engine because
of your second statement! I'm not concerned with battery failure, I'm
concerned with my ability to assemble a set of components, few as they are,
that will not fail in any circumstance.
NASA cant even do this. Why do you burden
yourself with this goal?
The Z-14 design is more reliable
than Z-13/8 by a significant margin because all of us do not have your
capability to assemble the components. Two battery ground connections and
two battery plus connections are a great sleeping aid to me. I'm using
smaller batteries so the weight penalty is only a few pounds.
Z-14? In a KR2? Can we talk about this some
more?
"Reliability" is generally a measure of
component failure rates. Any component taken
by itself can be analyzed for the purpose
of predicting a failure rate usually expressed
in "failures per quantity of service hours".
For disciplines that require exceedingly high
reliability rates we call out tested and perhaps
even screened parts. These have demonstrated failure
rates even if those numbers are deduced only in
the lab.
System reliability is another matter entirely.
The poor pilot's definition of a reliable system
is that which "never causes one to break a sweat."
Systems that occasionally experience a component
failure can still be very reliable. This is true
when the operator doesn't find it necessary to do more
than have the failure repaired before the next
flight. This is what keeps FBO's in business.
None of has enough money to craft a system with
established reliability components. Any of us
can craft a sweat-free system from hardware store
components by application of simple design
goals.
System reliability is strongly affected by
assembly process which is in turn influenced
by worker skill and knowledge. You've expressed
some concerns for your own skill levels. May
I suggest that a minimalist failure-tolerant
system skillfully assembled is far better than
layers of redundancy assembled with poorly
conceived motives or lack of understanding.
If your concerns for understanding are properly
founded, I'll suggest that assembling Z-14 with
poor skills is NOT more reliable than Z-13/8
assembled with nominal skills.
If you were assembling this airplane on a
deserted island with corked bottles as your
only communications mode, your worries about
understanding would be justified. However,
you are a member of a society of fellow
travelers with a huge skill-set and world
wide verbal and visual communications network
with nearly instant functionality.
As a member of this List for the past 6 years
or so, your lack of confidence for getting it
all put together right the first time is
curious. I'd be pleased to know how we fell
short of addressing your need for input.
I'll encourage you to stand back, take a
deep breath and join us in a discussion of
your design goals and a plan for getting
them implemented with a minimum of cost
weight and complexity. It would be a shame
to burden a KR-2 with many pounds of hardware
that steals payload and hampers performance.
This is particularly true if the added burdens
are no more than a band-aid on your perceptions
of understanding. Understanding is what the
AeroElectric-List is all about.
Bob . . .
---------------------------------------
( . . . a long habit of not thinking )
( a thing wrong, gives it a superficial )
( appearance of being right . . . )
( )
( -Thomas Paine 1776- )
---------------------------------------
Message 11
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| Subject: | Re: Magneto Switch Rating |
At 03:47 PM 6/25/2009, you wrote:
>Bob, I am having difficulty finding the electrical specifications
>required for toggle switches used as Mag switches.
>
>There is both a withstanding voltage and a current carrying
>capability that needs to be met, and I have a need to use miniature
>toggle switches rated at 5A/120VAC/28VDC for this function.
>
>Help appreciated.
>
>Thanks, Vern
Hmmm . . . I've never seen a rating requirement for
mag switches. Can you give me a link or send me
a copy?
I've seen a host of switch styles used as magneto
switches where it was very unlikely that the installer
was cognizant of any recommendations/requirements. I
was thinking that this airplane . . .
http://aeroelectric.com/Pictures/Switches/miniswitches.jpg
had miniature mag switches too but they don't show
in the picture.
I'm not aware of any successful application of miniature
toggles for magnetos. Some years ago I had an inquiry
about using a miniature rocker switch.
http://search.digikey.com/scripts/DkSearch/dksus.dll?Detail&name=SW322-ND
I suggested that the builder hook the two sides of
a two-pole switch in series to effectively double the
gap for open contacts (mag operating). I think he did
this and I've not heard back.
I'll suggest the same thing for what ever switch
you plan to try. Go with double-pole switch an
use contacts in series to short the mag in the
OFF condition. I'm 99% sure that you'll find this
approach satisfactory.
Bob . . .
---------------------------------------
( . . . a long habit of not thinking )
( a thing wrong, gives it a superficial )
( appearance of being right . . . )
( )
( -Thomas Paine 1776- )
---------------------------------------
Message 12
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| Subject: | Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report |
At 06:50 AM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
>All,
>
>I found this link on the rotary engine news group. It's a thorough
>NTSB report about a complex engine/electrical installation that the
>builder/pilot was unwilling and unprepared to finish correctly.
>
><http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id 071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&akey=1>http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id 071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&akey=1
I've had several private links to this posting.
Very sad. It's an unfortunate fact of the human
condition that rational thought processes and
understanding of simple-ideas can be so terribly
diminished by hazardous behaviors.
Let us strive to watch out for each other.
Don't be afraid to speak up when we perceive
that somebody's project is not going forward
with the best goals and processes we know how
to do.
Its far better to risk getting some builder
pissed off at you than to be thinking "I SHOULD
have told you so" while reading the NTSB report.
Bob . . .
---------------------------------------
( . . . a long habit of not thinking )
( a thing wrong, gives it a superficial )
( appearance of being right . . . )
( )
( -Thomas Paine 1776- )
---------------------------------------
Message 13
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| Subject: | Complex aircraft NTSB report |
Absolutely..This was so sad and many of us on the Vans airforce forum kinda
saw it coming.
I get slammed almost daily for my choice to use electric fuel pumps with no
mechanical backup from folks who are not engineers and don't understand my
system.
You know what, I would rather recieve a thousand emails of uninformed disse
nt for the potential of seeing one nugget of information that is maybe a fl
aw in my system.
None of us are so well informed that we can't learn something.
The accident airplane had a an Eggenfelner subaru conversion installed I be
lieve.
Cheers
Frank
________________________________
From: owner-aeroelectric-list-server@matronics.com [mailto:owner-aeroelectr
ic-list-server@matronics.com] On Behalf Of Robert L. Nuckolls, III
Sent: Friday, June 26, 2009 10:17 AM
Subject: Re: AeroElectric-List: Complex aircraft NTSB report
At 06:50 AM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
All,
I found this link on the rotary engine news group. It's a thorough NTSB re
port about a complex engine/electrical installation that the builder/pilot
was unwilling and unprepared to finish correctly.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id 071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA
023&akey=1
I've had several private links to this posting.
Very sad. It's an unfortunate fact of the human
condition that rational thought processes and
understanding of simple-ideas can be so terribly
diminished by hazardous behaviors.
Message 14
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| Subject: | Re: Battery Proximity and mounting |
Bob:
A complete non answer. Lot of words...no relevance.
On page 17-11 (rev11) you state that "RG battery reliability and performance
supplemented with good preventative maintenance drives probability of gross
battery failure to zero"
You don't say "near zero", "close to zero", "approaching zero", or any such
thing. To claim anything has a zero probability of failure is a pretty bold
statement to make. Further, judging from the general tone of your writing
style, there's as much a chance of that statement being rhetoric as
anything else.
When I first read your book a couple years ago, I tried to get some
clarification from you on that statement. At first, when I asked directly,
you simply didn't address the question. I gave up on that approach. Since
then, whenever other group members have touched on the issue, I have
attempted, by asking questions in different ways, to get you to explain
further the meaning of your statement. In response to the inquiries (mine
and others) on this subject, you either:
1. Don't answer.
2. Provide theoretical fluffery
3. Answer questions that aren't asked
4. Introduce extraneous issues
5. Claim its beyond understanding
At first, I thought I was close to getting some answers this time, but as
before, the answers degraded into one or more of the above categories. I
really don't understand why you can't give a full and complete explanation
of what you mean by "gross battery failure" and "zero probability" in some
meaningful and understandable way. After all, its your statement, you
should be able to substantiate it. But, that's apparently not the case.
I've noticed that you seem to follow that pattern on a few other issues as
well. Anyway, I'm tired of trying to coax an explanation out of you so I
won't bring up it up again. I'll just assume the statement was the result
of your writing style and not to be taken literally. In any regard, I
don't need the information now, and when I do, I'll get it from other
sources.
Thanks
----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert L. Nuckolls, III" <nuckolls.bob@aeroelectric.com>
Sent: Thursday, June 25, 2009 9:21 PM
Subject: Re: AeroElectric-List: Battery Proximity and mounting
> <nuckolls.bob@aeroelectric.com>
>
> At 07:59 PM 6/25/2009, you wrote:
>>
>>Bob:
>>
>>Are any of those reasons for Z-14 as a result of the design and
>>performance of the RG batteries by themselves, or are they the result of
>>other potential failures extraneous to the batteries? If any of the
>>reasons are a result of the batteries, what are they and what are the
>>probabilities of them happening?
>
> Z-14 is the "mother of all electrical systems" intended
> to address the design goals for probably less than 1%
> of the OBAM aircraft fleet. This would be the Lancair
> or Glasair with fully redundant IFR panels on both
> pilot seats wherein the aircraft's missions often
> include two rated pilots and a high percentage of
> flight in IMC.
>
> Batteries swapped out when their battery-only endurance
> capabilities drop below 2+ hours are still cranking
> and engine nicely . . . and a battery this capable is
> exceedingly unlikely to go south on you en route to
> aunt Martha's.
>
> For my purposes and for the purposes of the majority
> of the OBAM fleet, Z-13/8 with a battery maintenance
> program offers SYSTEM reliability that is head and
> shoulders above the majority of TC fleet up to and
> including some twin turbine powered aircraft.
>
>>Another group member stated that "the battery could fail so that it can no
>>longer supply current". He may be correct that I misunderstood your
>>previous answer. I would consider that within the scope of my previous
>>question, in that it seems to me that if a battery were to suddenly be
>>unable to supply current, it would be the result of some sort of internal
>>failure. If that in fact can happen, what are the circumstances that
>>would cause that, and what are the probabilities of it happening?
>
> Can't put a number on "probability" and if I
> could, it probably wouldn't be significant to
> you. The point about battery technology and
> service life is that hundreds of thousands of
> airplanes have launched into IFR with a single generator
> and single flooded battery with a high probability
> of a now-sweat termination of the flight. The
> demonstrated level of system reliability was such
> that many pilots exploited the capability with
> little concern for system failure. The majority
> of accidents were (and still are) seeded by
> poor judgement and/or conditions beyond
> control of the pilot that were not related
> to system reliability.
>
> Now we can easily install two engine driven
> power sources to charge a well maintained,
> very user-friendly RG battery. A combination
> that reduces risks of power starvation to
> still lower numbers.
>
> If you're willing to jump in a rented C182
> and launch into the grey with equipment
> certificated 30 years ago, then getting into
> your RV fitted with Z-13/8 + RG battery has to
> be more comfortable yet. Bottom line is that with
> either airplane, your risk for experiencing
> an unhappy day in the cockpit has more to
> do with what's between your ears than with
> what's under the cowl.
>
>>I intend to use to use two batteries for the maintenance benefits you
>>outline in your book and for the additional cranking power.
>
> Dual batteries are indicated only for those special
> conditions I cited earlier. If you don't have those
> configurations . . . dual batteries are only a cost,
> volume and weight burden on your project.
>
>>Right now I'm just trying to get a clear understanding of the RG battery's
>>reliability and performance limitations.
>
> If all you want is more cranking power, install ONE
> bigger battery. But cranking power of RG batteries
> is so much better than their flooded counterparts
> that we're installing systems like Z-13/8 with a small
> fraction of the hardware weight in a 1975 Cessna
> 182. Unless you have operational features that
> encourage dual batteries, please consider installing
> a single 17 to 18 a.h. RG battery. You can always
> up-size later. But consider leaving 16 pounds of
> hardware on the ground until you KNOW you need it.
> 16 extra pounds of baggage or fuel is USEFUL . . . 16
> unnecessary pounds of battery is . . . well . . .
> you know.
>
> I'm betting you'll never need it.
>
> Bob . . .
>
>
>
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| Subject: | Re: Magneto Switch Rating |
See: http://www.verticalpower.com/forums/showthread.php?t=37
--------
Marc Ausman
http://www.verticalpower.com
RV-7 IO-390 Flying
Read this topic online here:
http://forums.matronics.com/viewtopic.php?p=250211#250211
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| Subject: | Battery Proximity and mounting |
Bob,
After reading your response to my wanting two batteries I again took a look
at my design. To be more accurate, I have a hybrid version with Z-14 as the
power distribution section (alternator, dynamo, and batteries) and Z-13
implimentation of the main and essential buses. The main bus is on the
battery bus supported by the 40A alternator and and the essential bus is
supported by your recomended Shack bridge rectifier fed from both battery
buses. There is also a backup essential bus power switch from the second
batery bus.
My reason for redundant power distribution is that there can be some
unforseen failure modes (vibration, fatigue, materiel defect, or assembly
error) that would percipitate sweat on my part with hours of fuel in the
tank no fuel being pumped to the engine or spark in the ignition.
There have been a couple of pilots responding to this thread indicating that
they have flown successfully for hundreds of hours on the primary system and
subsequently decided that the second battery is not needed. In hind sight I
could agree with them on Z13/20. For now I'll carry the extra insurance as
it doesn't add much weight or complexity and it gets the best parts of both
designs as it applies to my design goals.
Regards,
Bob Lee
N52BL KR2
Suwanee, GA USA
92% done only 67% to go!
Message 17
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| Subject: | Re: Battery Proximity and mounting |
At 12:46 PM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
>
>Bob:
>
>A complete non answer. Lot of words...no relevance.
>
>On page 17-11 (rev11) you state that "RG battery reliability and
>performance supplemented with good preventative maintenance drives
>probability of gross battery failure to zero"
>
>You don't say "near zero", "close to zero", "approaching zero", or
>any such thing. To claim anything has a zero probability of failure
>is a pretty bold statement to make. Further, judging from the
>general tone of your writing style, there's as much a chance
>of that statement being rhetoric as anything else.
Gross battery failures are functions of two things.
Design or manufacturing defect -OR- abuse of the battery
that places stresses on it that are outside design limits.
Modern RG batteries are assembled on highly mechanized
processes and demonstrate thousands to millions of units
of field service history per year. Very few instances of
design or manufacturing defect go un-corrected. This
leaves abuse which cannot be predicted or quantified.
I'll go fix that statement to read "very close to zero".
>When I first read your book a couple years ago, I tried to get some
>clarification from you on that statement. At first, when I asked
>directly, you simply didn't address the question. I gave up on that
>approach. Since then, whenever other group members have touched on
>the issue, I have attempted, by asking questions in different ways,
>to get you to explain further the meaning of your statement. In
>response to the inquiries (mine and others) on this subject, you either:
> 1. Don't answer.
> 2. Provide theoretical fluffery
> 3. Answer questions that aren't asked
> 4. Introduce extraneous issues
> 5. Claim its beyond understanding
>
>At first, I thought I was close to getting some answers this time,
>but as before, the answers degraded into one or more of the above
>categories. I really don't understand why you can't give a full and
>complete explanation of what you mean by "gross battery failure" and
>"zero probability" in some meaningful and understandable way. After
>all, its your statement, you should be able to substantiate
>it. But, that's apparently not the case. I've noticed that you seem
>to follow that pattern on a few other issues as well. Anyway, I'm
>tired of trying to coax an explanation out of you so I won't bring
>up it up again. I'll just assume the statement was the result of
>your writing style and not to be taken literally. In any regard, I
>don't need the information now, and when I do, I'll get it from other sources.
You wrote:
"I intend to use to use two batteries for the maintenance benefits
you outline in your book and for the additional cranking power."
I recommended that you explore the need/value for "more
cranking power" with a follow-up that many, many airplanes
are flying with single 17 a.h. batteries and enjoy satisfactory
cranking performance. You also said:
"Right now I'm just trying to get a clear understanding of the RG
battery's reliability and performance limitations."
To the second statement it was my intention to suggest that
battery "reliability" given in terms of failures per flight
hour is not possible. Nobody has done the studies nor have
the candidate manufacturers implemented statistical process
controls intended to sustain advertised reliability numbers.
It was not my intent to be mysterious or condescending. I'm
only saying that credible "reliability" numbers don't exist.
But assuming they did. Let us hypothesize that a flooded
24 a.h. Rebatt has a 453 failures per million flight hours
and a 24 a.h. Odyssey was 305 failures per million flight
hours . . . how would you use that data? Suppose I said
that you have a 1 in 103 probability of ending a flight
due to a battery failure? Of what use is that number? And
how many mud-throwing fights can we start by debating how
that number was calculated?
First we need to define and separate "failure" from "end-of-
life." The vast majority of batteries in ALL vehicles are
replaced because they are at end-of-life as demonstrated
by a failure to crank the engine. Would you call that a
"failure" in aircraft system reliability parlance?
In aircraft parlance, a battery that fails to crank
an engine is probably months past end-of-life established
by battery-only endurance design goals.
Consider this same conversation going on about tires.
How could anyone make recommendations for reliability
of any particular tire without defining weight
of aircraft, pilot skills, runway surfaces, landing
speeds, etc. etc.
A crummy tire can last a long time under the right
circumstances . . . a top-of-the-line tire can
be abused and used up with some dispatch.
What do you wish I would have told you? Are you looking
for brand recommendations. Service recommendations?
Charging recommendations? ALL of the above can have a
profound effect on service life of ANY battery. I can
only suggest the universal recipe for success calls
for . . .
Monitoring the performance of any brand or style of
battery and replacing it when it falls below some
standard of performance THAT YOU ADOPT. Replacement
is based on failure to store and deliver energy
needed for YOUR battery only endurance mode.
This is what we do in biz-jets. None of those
batteries have published reliability numbers. In the
fleet, a few folks get 3-4 years of service.
A few folks get less than 2 years. Most fall
someplace in between. An exceedingly small number
of the total experience unanticipated gross failure.
How would you have me describe "reliability" of those
batteries?
For me to offer reliability opinions without also
stating design, operating and maintenance goals for
the battery would be without foundation.
I'm sorry about your disappointment but I hope it's
clear that your question cannot be simply answered.
If you discover "another source" that offers
satisfying answers, please share that information
with us.
Bob . . .
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| Subject: | Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report |
I wrote about this yesterday on Letters From Flyover Country. Please keep in mind
also that this was the NTSB factual report. It is not the probable cause report,
although I think we can figure out what's coming.
As I was reading the report, I was reminded of two articles. One was the Kitplanes
article (folks who know me know which one I'm talking about), where the author
wrote that people should just get their plane in the air. Period. And the
other was a thread on VAF a couple of weeks ago basically goading those people
who are deviating from planes and taking forever, to just hurry up and get in
the air.
What we have here appears to be a concession of safety for the fastest way into
the air.
This is a good reminder that a slow builder, a careful builder, a builder whose
first goal is not to get in the air as soon as possible, is not someone to criticize
or ridicule, it's someone to emulate.
--------
Bob Collins
St. Paul, Minn.
RV-7A - Running wires
http://rvbuildershotline.com
Day job: http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/special/columns/news_cut/
Read this topic online here:
http://forums.matronics.com/viewtopic.php?p=250234#250234
Message 19
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| Subject: | Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report |
Robert L. Nuckolls, III wrote:
> At 06:50 AM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
>> All,
>>
>> I found this link on the rotary engine news group. It's a thorough
>> NTSB report about a complex engine/electrical installation that the
>> builder/pilot was unwilling and unprepared to finish correctly.
>>
>> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id 071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&akey=1
>> <http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id 071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&akey=1>
>
>
> I've had several private links to this posting.
> Very sad. It's an unfortunate fact of the human
> condition that rational thought processes and
> understanding of simple-ideas can be so terribly
> diminished by hazardous behaviors.
>
Let's not let simple ideas get lost in our sympathy for the pilot in
this accident. Most of this report is superfluous fluff with little
bearing on what could have caused the accident. In fact, there is no
statement of what caused the accident that could be blamed on the lack
of a rational thought processes on the part of the builder.
Most of the report was dedicated to pointing out how the high-end EFIS
was not calibrated. At no point was the lack of calibration cited as a
contributing factor to the accident. The man was flying day VFR. The
instrument was superfluous for the mission. The fact that the pilot was
not familiar with the instrument's operation was superfluous to the
report. The fact that the instrument was in the plane at all was
superfluous to the report. How could anything displayed on an
uncalibrated EFIS translate into a plane taking a 35 to 60 degree
nosedive during a day VFR flight?
Most of the remainder of the report was equally superfluous. The first
flight occurred on July 12. The accident occurred on November 2. The
fact that clecoes held the cowling on for the first flight was
superfluous to the accident report. It might have been germane if an
accident had occurred with the clecoes still in use, but that was not
the case.
The fact that the propeller was under manual control vs some sort of
electronics is superfluous. Are there not many examples of airplanes
flying just fine with manual control? And I hear that there are a few
flying with no pitch control at all. There is some information that the
pilot was having issues with coordinating the engine power with the
propeller pitch controls. But that does not translate to taking a 35 to
60 degree nose dive into terra firma. I can't even translate it to a
situation where the pilot would not be able to maintain altitude. It
might translate to an inability to maintain smooth level flight, but
there is a wide gulf between smooth level flight and a dirt bath.
The report pointed out that the rudder trim was attached with duct
tape. The key word is "attached". How did a *rudder* trim that was
*attached* contribute to a 60 degree nosedive? How does an *attached*
rudder trim even make it difficult to maintain altitude? An aileron
trim tab rod had been broken and poorly repaired. Was the weak
attachment cause of an accident, or more superfluous data?
The report makes hay of the pilots lack of high performance training.
He was flying the plane for nearly 4 months before the accident. I
would imagine that high performance training would cover issues like
severe P factors and overspeeding the airplane. Is "maintaining
altitude" taught exclusively in high performance trainging now? If not,
why is the lack of such training an issue? The report details the
pilots rush to get to Oshkosh, and the pilots willingness to falsify
records in order to meet legal requirements. How did any of that
contribute to an accident that occurred months later?
There were some wires not connected. So? Did any of them contribute to
the inability to maintain altitude? I have several wires in my project
that are slated for future upgrades. It's much easier to run them now
than when everything is closed up. They are not connected to anything.
If something really bad happens to me, those wires will have nothing to
do with it, but will "unconnected cables" be cited in the report anyway?
I suggest reading the report again...but cross out all the superfluous
lines that obviously have nothing at all to do with the accident. Cross
out the parts that point out "He didn't follow the rules. He was a
BAAAAD man." It'll be a much shorter report. The pilot of N289DT may
very well be a prime candidate for a Darwin Award, but we can't know
that from reading this report. All I can tell is that the investigator
was much more concerned with pointing out how the pilot was not
following procedure than about what occurred.
--
http://www.ernest.isa-geek.org
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| Subject: | Battery Proximity and mounting |
At 02:01 PM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
>
>Bob,
>
>After reading your response to my wanting two batteries I again took a look
>at my design. To be more accurate, I have a hybrid version with Z-14 as the
>power distribution section (alternator, dynamo, and batteries) and Z-13
>implimentation of the main and essential buses. The main bus is on the
>battery bus supported by the 40A alternator and and the essential bus is
>supported by your recomended Shack bridge rectifier fed from both battery
>buses. There is also a backup essential bus power switch from the second
>batery bus.
Okay. The term "hybrid" raise questions. The Z-figures
are stand-alone, recipes for success that have passed
muster for some analysis of failure modes and matched
to missions. Mixing/matching between Z-figures should
be evaluated for new failure modes. Can you sketch your
power distribution and scan it for sharing with he group?
>My reason for redundant power distribution is that there can be some
>unforseen failure modes (vibration, fatigue, materiel defect, or assembly
>error) that would percipitate sweat on my part with hours of fuel in the
>tank no fuel being pumped to the engine or spark in the ignition.
My sense is that your failure analysis may have been
too broad with respect to kinds and numbers of
failures. Many of my readers have stacked multiple
failures onto a single flight cycle. This is so
rare that part 23 aircraft don't even consider
multiple failures for certification, part 25 airplanes
consider it and ask the builder to show better one in
ten to the minus 6 probability in a single system.
But the neat thing is that completely independent
systems need not be nearly so failure resistant because
their failures do not "stack". You only need to show
a 1 x 10^-6 probability for failure in any single
flight cycle. MUCH easier.
>There have been a couple of pilots responding to this thread indicating that
>they have flown successfully for hundreds of hours on the primary system and
>subsequently decided that the second battery is not needed. In hind sight I
>could agree with them on Z13/20. For now I'll carry the extra insurance as
>it doesn't add much weight or complexity and it gets the best parts of both
>designs as it applies to my design goals.
Have you done a load analysis on minimum
energy requirements for sustained flight? Exactly
how many watt-seconds of energy per flight hour are
needed to run your engine? What engine are you
using? Let's look at your hybridization and
ponder the effects.
Bob . . .
---------------------------------------
( . . . a long habit of not thinking )
( a thing wrong, gives it a superficial )
( appearance of being right . . . )
( )
( -Thomas Paine 1776- )
---------------------------------------
Message 21
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| Subject: | Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report |
At 03:16 PM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
<echristley@nc.rr.com>
Let's not let simple ideas get lost in our sympathy for the pilot in
this accident. Most of this report is superfluous fluff with little
bearing on what could have caused the accident. In fact, there is no
statement of what caused the accident that could be blamed on the
lack of a rational thought processes on the part of the builder.
Most of the report was dedicated to pointing out how the high-end
EFIS was not calibrated. At no point was the lack of calibration
cited as a contributing factor to the accident. The man was flying
day VFR. The instrument was superfluous for the mission. The fact
that the pilot was not familiar with the instrument's operation was
superfluous to the report. The fact that the instrument was in the
plane at all was superfluous to the report. How could anything
displayed on an uncalibrated EFIS translate into a plane taking a 35
to 60 degree nosedive during a day VFR flight?
To be sure, the first documents generated by
any well crafted investigation are "factual reports".
I've done many and was soundly admonished by
my boss for inserting anything that smacked of
analysis, supposition or opinion. In fact, we
always dictated field notes, had them typed,
and then judiciously edited them to offer only
factual information. The tapes were then
destroyed after the field investigator compared
his tapes with the finished document.
Most of the remainder of the report was equally superfluous . . .
<snip>
I suggest reading the report again...but cross out all the
superfluous lines that obviously have nothing at all to do with the
accident. Cross out the parts that point out "He didn't follow the
rules. He was a BAAAAD man." It'll be a much shorter report. The
pilot of N289DT may very well be a prime candidate for a Darwin
Award, but we can't know that from reading this report. All I can
tell is that the investigator was much more concerned with pointing
out how the pilot was not following procedure than about what occurred.
Points well taken. Everything that is factual
should be in there and evaluated for significance
by others who are detached from the natural emotions
that arise from investigation. Digging through
bent aluminum and archiving of written records
is a task that should never be mixed with attempts
to assign significance and deduce cause/effect.
The NTSB Blue Ribbon Report will be produced
later and screened for significance by less-invested
minds. The report suggests some risky attitudes
on the part of the builder but the exact cause
of engine failure is pure physics. We can only
grieve for his attitudes but learning can happen
only if we understand the physics.
Bob . . .
---------------------------------------
( . . . a long habit of not thinking )
( a thing wrong, gives it a superficial )
( appearance of being right . . . )
( )
( -Thomas Paine 1776- )
---------------------------------------
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| Subject: | Re: Magneto Switch Rating |
At 01:26 PM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
>
>See: http://www.verticalpower.com/forums/showthread.php?t=37
Marc,
Thanks for sharing this. I'd not looked at the scope
trace on a mag p-lead in many years. I thought the voltage
was more on the order of 300v but that might be
across the points of the distributor rotor in my
283 Chevy! Too long ago . . .
Your data confirms that my suggestion to Vern offers
a robust solution to his design goal.
Busted 100 degrees down there yet?
Bob . . .
---------------------------------------
( . . . a long habit of not thinking )
( a thing wrong, gives it a superficial )
( appearance of being right . . . )
( )
( -Thomas Paine 1776- )
---------------------------------------
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| Subject: | Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report |
As another poster pointed out, this report is "Factual", not "Probably
Cause". I imagine that the investigator made an effort to find out as
much as he could about the airplane and pilot and this report is the
culmination of this search. I believe that's a reasonably common method
for investigating crashes.
Another way to interpret the report is that it is documenting the fact
that there were many things that could have caused the pilot to get
distracted from the cardinal "Aviate, Navigate, then Communicate." If I
were investigating an airplane crash I would be interested in listing all
discrepancies from "normal" practice as any such deviations could cause
the crash. This report does not find or imply blame for the crash.
Matt-
> <echristley@nc.rr.com>
>
> Robert L. Nuckolls, III wrote:
>> At 06:50 AM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
>>> All,
>>>
>>> I found this link on the rotary engine news group. It's a thorough
>>> NTSB report about a complex engine/electrical installation that the
>>> builder/pilot was unwilling and unprepared to finish correctly.
>>>
>>> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id 071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&akey=1
>>> <http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id 071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&akey=1>
>>
>>
>> I've had several private links to this posting.
>> Very sad. It's an unfortunate fact of the human
>> condition that rational thought processes and
>> understanding of simple-ideas can be so terribly
>> diminished by hazardous behaviors.
>>
> Let's not let simple ideas get lost in our sympathy for the pilot in
> this accident. Most of this report is superfluous fluff with little
> bearing on what could have caused the accident. In fact, there is no
> statement of what caused the accident that could be blamed on the lack
> of a rational thought processes on the part of the builder.
>
> Most of the report was dedicated to pointing out how the high-end EFIS
> was not calibrated. At no point was the lack of calibration cited as a
> contributing factor to the accident. The man was flying day VFR. The
> instrument was superfluous for the mission. The fact that the pilot was
> not familiar with the instrument's operation was superfluous to the
> report. The fact that the instrument was in the plane at all was
> superfluous to the report. How could anything displayed on an
> uncalibrated EFIS translate into a plane taking a 35 to 60 degree
> nosedive during a day VFR flight?
>
> Most of the remainder of the report was equally superfluous. The first
> flight occurred on July 12. The accident occurred on November 2. The
> fact that clecoes held the cowling on for the first flight was
> superfluous to the accident report. It might have been germane if an
> accident had occurred with the clecoes still in use, but that was not
> the case.
>
> The fact that the propeller was under manual control vs some sort of
> electronics is superfluous. Are there not many examples of airplanes
> flying just fine with manual control? And I hear that there are a few
> flying with no pitch control at all. There is some information that the
> pilot was having issues with coordinating the engine power with the
> propeller pitch controls. But that does not translate to taking a 35 to
> 60 degree nose dive into terra firma. I can't even translate it to a
> situation where the pilot would not be able to maintain altitude. It
> might translate to an inability to maintain smooth level flight, but
> there is a wide gulf between smooth level flight and a dirt bath.
>
> The report pointed out that the rudder trim was attached with duct
> tape. The key word is "attached". How did a *rudder* trim that was
> *attached* contribute to a 60 degree nosedive? How does an *attached*
> rudder trim even make it difficult to maintain altitude? An aileron
> trim tab rod had been broken and poorly repaired. Was the weak
> attachment cause of an accident, or more superfluous data?
>
> The report makes hay of the pilots lack of high performance training.
> He was flying the plane for nearly 4 months before the accident. I
> would imagine that high performance training would cover issues like
> severe P factors and overspeeding the airplane. Is "maintaining
> altitude" taught exclusively in high performance trainging now? If not,
> why is the lack of such training an issue? The report details the
> pilots rush to get to Oshkosh, and the pilots willingness to falsify
> records in order to meet legal requirements. How did any of that
> contribute to an accident that occurred months later?
>
> There were some wires not connected. So? Did any of them contribute to
> the inability to maintain altitude? I have several wires in my project
> that are slated for future upgrades. It's much easier to run them now
> than when everything is closed up. They are not connected to anything.
> If something really bad happens to me, those wires will have nothing to
> do with it, but will "unconnected cables" be cited in the report anyway?
>
> I suggest reading the report again...but cross out all the superfluous
> lines that obviously have nothing at all to do with the accident. Cross
> out the parts that point out "He didn't follow the rules. He was a
> BAAAAD man." It'll be a much shorter report. The pilot of N289DT may
> very well be a prime candidate for a Darwin Award, but we can't know
> that from reading this report. All I can tell is that the investigator
> was much more concerned with pointing out how the pilot was not
> following procedure than about what occurred.
>
> --
>
> http://www.ernest.isa-geek.org
>
>
Message 24
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| Subject: | Complex aircraft NTSB report |
Wow, it's as if you and I read two different accounts of this unfortunate
accident. I came away with the distinct impression that the builder/pilot
was both careless and impatient, and utterly indifferent to the FAA
regulations governing pilots and amateur built airplanes.
Here we have a novice pilot (221.4 hours logged) flying a complex, high
performance aircraft without logging the required training. I'll agree with
you that it is possible that the pilot had sufficient experience by the time
of the crash that he should have been able to find an instructor that would
provide the necessary logbook endorsement to fly the airplane, but the fact
remains there was no such endorsement, so no flights up to and including the
accident flight were legal.
There were many indications in the NTSB report of violations and just plain
bad judgment. Let's look at them in the same order that they are mentioned
in the report.
The blade retention nuts were also found tightened approximately 1/4 inch
tighter than the index marks scribed on the hub. This however, did not
appear to affect the pitch rotation friction.
A minor error but indicative (when taken with many other similar factors) of
careless assembly and an urge to get the airplane finished on a tight
schedule.
Examination of the propeller controller revealed that it was not the
propeller controller that was manufactured by the propeller manufacturer.
Another minor discrepancy that is also indicative of that urge to get
flying. Sure, he could just fly as if it was a fixed pitch prop and avoid
the workload associated with manually adjusting pitch, but the report seems
to suggest that was not the case.
It gets worse.
.examination of the flight control system revealed that, the outboard ends
of the ailerons had been filled with foam and then fiberglass had been used
to seal in the foam. A trim tab for the rudder was discovered to be attached
with duct tape. The lock nuts which were used on the rod ends for the pitch
control system could be spun by hand and were not tightened against the rod
ends, and were found on the threaded portion of the rods approximately 1/4
inch away from what would be their normal seated positions. The right trim
tab rod on the elevator was connected to its rod end by two threads and was
shorter than the trim tab rod for the left trim tab. It displayed evidence
that the end of the trim tab rod at one time had broken off, and then had
been re-inserted into the rod end, as the rest of the threaded portion was
not present.
I can't see how to interpret that paragraph other than the builder had what
I would charitably call "a relaxed attitude" toward quality workmanship.
This isn't sloppy upholstery or paint here, this is flight safety related.
Multiple wires showed no evidence of having being connected prior to impact.
Examination of the cableing (sic) connected to the electrical system's
contactor relays, revealed that a cable was not secured to its corresponding
terminal on the contact
or relay.
More of that "relaxed attitude."
Examination of the pilot's logbook revealed no evidence of the training
required by the FAA for operation of an airplane with an engine of more than
200 horsepower.
The accident flight was in violation of the FARs and so were all previous
flights.
Examination of the airplane's maintenance logbook revealed that on July 10,
2007, the FAA issued a special airworthiness certificate allowing operation
of the airplane.
Seven days later, on July 17, 2007, the pilot certified in the maintenance
logbook that the prescribed 40 hours of test flying required by the FAA had
been completed however, no record of separate entries for each of the test
flights was discovered. The pilot also certified on that date that the
airplane was controllable throughout its normal range of speeds and
maneuvers, and that it had no hazardous characteristics or design flaws and
that it was safe for operation. The pilot additionally certified that he had
demonstrated by flight test, the operating data for the airplane and the
weight and balance data.
Anyone who believes that the 40 hour test program was actually completed in
seven days probably also has seen Bigfoot and the Loch Ness Monster, and
believes in both Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny. Pardon my skepticism,
but I don't think he did it, and I also think he admitted as much when he
was quoted (later in the report) saying "That's not what the logbooks say"
at OSH when one other builder stated to the pilot that "There's no way you
could have completed your fly off yet." Later in the NTSB report it says
that "On July 13, 2007 the pilot emailed an RV builders group that he . had
39 hours and 20 minutes left to fly off." making it even less believable
that the remaining time was actually flown in 4 more days.
Not only did he not fly the test flights but he faked the weight and balance
at least once (either in the log or in reporting to the FAA).
Review of the FAA airworthiness records also revealed that the weight and
balance data supplied to the FAA differed from the weight and balance
information in the airplane's maintenance logbook. These differences
included differing centers of gravity and a difference in empty weight.
And to support my contention that he was rushing things a bit the report
says.
According to friends and other builders, the pilot was impatient with the
time it was taking to do everything, and he was pushing to get the airplane
assembled and flying in time for the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA)
convention at Wittman Regional Airport, (OSH) Oshkosh, Wisconsin. This
resulted in the pilot doing such things as requesting the instrument panel
builder to send the panel "as quickly as possible," and traveling to the
engine builder's facility to pick up the engine instead of waiting for
shipment.
There's nothing wrong with using "will call" instead of waiting for a
shipment but this is not the only instance of being in too much of a hurry
to get the project finished.
On July 14, 2007, the pilot and the engine builder departed 4G1 for X50.
The last time I checked Florida was not "within an area around 4G1, and I
doubt that the engine builder was a required crew member, further indicative
of the pilot's disregard for the FARs. With only four days since the
issuance of the special airworthiness certificate (call that 96 hours on the
clock) is it virtually impossible that the flight was legal.
Had the Phase 1 tests been completed as required the pilot should not have
needed this exchange.
On November 1, 2007, the day before the accident, the pilot once again
emailed his friend asking:
"What speeds do you carry on base and final when at max load? I am taking
the family on our first trip and I am being paranoid but this is the first
time I have taken more than 1 passenger. So just doing due diligence."
Due diligence, indeed! have not seen any indication in the NTSB report of
any due diligence.
Best regards,
Rob Housman
Irvine, CA
Europa XS Tri-Gear
A070
Airframe complete
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-aeroelectric-list-server@matronics.com
[mailto:owner-aeroelectric-list-server@matronics.com] On Behalf Of Ernest
Christley
Sent: Friday, June 26, 2009 1:17 PM
Subject: Re: AeroElectric-List: Complex aircraft NTSB report
<echristley@nc.rr.com>
Robert L. Nuckolls, III wrote:
> At 06:50 AM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
>> All,
>>
>> I found this link on the rotary engine news group. It's a thorough
>> NTSB report about a complex engine/electrical installation that the
>> builder/pilot was unwilling and unprepared to finish correctly.
>>
>>
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id 071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&a
key=1
>>
<http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id 071120X01821&ntsbno=NYC08FA023&
akey=1>
>
>
> I've had several private links to this posting.
> Very sad. It's an unfortunate fact of the human
> condition that rational thought processes and
> understanding of simple-ideas can be so terribly
> diminished by hazardous behaviors.
>
Let's not let simple ideas get lost in our sympathy for the pilot in
this accident. Most of this report is superfluous fluff with little
bearing on what could have caused the accident. In fact, there is no
statement of what caused the accident that could be blamed on the lack
of a rational thought processes on the part of the builder.
Most of the report was dedicated to pointing out how the high-end EFIS
was not calibrated. At no point was the lack of calibration cited as a
contributing factor to the accident. The man was flying day VFR. The
instrument was superfluous for the mission. The fact that the pilot was
not familiar with the instrument's operation was superfluous to the
report. The fact that the instrument was in the plane at all was
superfluous to the report. How could anything displayed on an
uncalibrated EFIS translate into a plane taking a 35 to 60 degree
nosedive during a day VFR flight?
Most of the remainder of the report was equally superfluous. The first
flight occurred on July 12. The accident occurred on November 2. The
fact that clecoes held the cowling on for the first flight was
superfluous to the accident report. It might have been germane if an
accident had occurred with the clecoes still in use, but that was not
the case.
The fact that the propeller was under manual control vs some sort of
electronics is superfluous. Are there not many examples of airplanes
flying just fine with manual control? And I hear that there are a few
flying with no pitch control at all. There is some information that the
pilot was having issues with coordinating the engine power with the
propeller pitch controls. But that does not translate to taking a 35 to
60 degree nose dive into terra firma. I can't even translate it to a
situation where the pilot would not be able to maintain altitude. It
might translate to an inability to maintain smooth level flight, but
there is a wide gulf between smooth level flight and a dirt bath.
The report pointed out that the rudder trim was attached with duct
tape. The key word is "attached". How did a *rudder* trim that was
*attached* contribute to a 60 degree nosedive? How does an *attached*
rudder trim even make it difficult to maintain altitude? An aileron
trim tab rod had been broken and poorly repaired. Was the weak
attachment cause of an accident, or more superfluous data?
The report makes hay of the pilots lack of high performance training.
He was flying the plane for nearly 4 months before the accident. I
would imagine that high performance training would cover issues like
severe P factors and overspeeding the airplane. Is "maintaining
altitude" taught exclusively in high performance trainging now? If not,
why is the lack of such training an issue? The report details the
pilots rush to get to Oshkosh, and the pilots willingness to falsify
records in order to meet legal requirements. How did any of that
contribute to an accident that occurred months later?
There were some wires not connected. So? Did any of them contribute to
the inability to maintain altitude? I have several wires in my project
that are slated for future upgrades. It's much easier to run them now
than when everything is closed up. They are not connected to anything.
If something really bad happens to me, those wires will have nothing to
do with it, but will "unconnected cables" be cited in the report anyway?
I suggest reading the report again...but cross out all the superfluous
lines that obviously have nothing at all to do with the accident. Cross
out the parts that point out "He didn't follow the rules. He was a
BAAAAD man." It'll be a much shorter report. The pilot of N289DT may
very well be a prime candidate for a Darwin Award, but we can't know
that from reading this report. All I can tell is that the investigator
was much more concerned with pointing out how the pilot was not
following procedure than about what occurred.
--
http://www.ernest.isa-geek.org
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| Subject: | Complex aircraft NTSB report |
As I build my RV, I also tend to want to have the rod end bearing jam nuts
torqued down. Oh, and if a threaded rod breaks, I'll probably replace it
rather than just stick it in with the broken part absent.
The problem with many of us who knew Dan is that he was a good guy. A really
nice guy.
I certainly would want to look again at the DAR who signed off and I feel
bad for the friends mentioned in the report who clearly tried to tell him a
few things and I'm guessing they're kicking themselves for not being a
little more direct.
One tragedy WAS averted here. I believe Dan had planned to put his family in
this plane later that day and fly to Boston.
Let's be careful as we discuss this not to get too insulting toward Dan
while learning from his death. It's a very difficult close-to-home story for
those of us in the RV community.
Message 26
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| Subject: | Battery Proximity and mounting |
Lectric Bob asked:
Have you done a load analysis on minimum
energy requirements for sustained flight? Exactly
how many watt-seconds of energy per flight hour are
needed to run your engine?
Don't have watt-seconds/flight-hour but there is a spread sheet with amps
required in various flight modes. Here's a link to my electrical system
design documentation.
http://kr.flyboybob.com/web_pages/kr2/electrical%20and%20instrument/electric
al.htm
At the bottom of the page there are links to the wiring diagrams.
Regards,
Bob Lee
N52BL KR2
Suwanee, GA USA
92% done only 67% to go!
Message 27
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| Subject: | 12 vs. 24 volt system |
I am in the process of buying an engine. I am told by TCM, that the FADEC is
only available in 24V and they are not supporting a 12V system. I have
designed my aircraft for 12V, however other than some lights and my
Hydraulic pump motor and pressurization outflow valve, everything else will
work on 12/32V. Is there an easy way to convert the 24V to 12V for the
hydraulic pump and outflow valve? The heavy user is the Hydraulic motor,
calling for a 12V/50A fused supply. Any thoughts on doing a 24-12V high amp
conversion would be appreciated.
Giff Marr
LIV-P 75%
Message 28
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| Subject: | Splicing into D-sub wires. |
Bob - do you have a comic book about splicing a second 20 AWG wire into the
wire(s) heading into a D-sub connector? I looked through the articles at
http://www.aeroelectric.com/articles.html, but didn't find exactly what I
was trying to accomplish.
I have a 37 pin connector which is plugged into a device. I want to tap
into 5 of those wires to connect to another gizmo, and figured you already
have a razzle-dazzle way to accomplish it.
Thanks.
Sam Hoskins
Murphysboro, IL
www.samhoskins.blogspot.com
Message 29
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| Subject: | Re: Magneto Switch Rating |
Bob, Marc, thanks for the info.
Odd that in all the years, I've never seen a rating until Marc's reference.
Seems to be lost in the folklore.
Vern
----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert L. Nuckolls, III" <nuckolls.bob@aeroelectric.com>
Sent: Friday, June 26, 2009 3:08 PM
Subject: Re: AeroElectric-List: Re: Magneto Switch Rating
> <nuckolls.bob@aeroelectric.com>
>
> At 01:26 PM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
>><marc@verticalpower.com>
>>
>>See: http://www.verticalpower.com/forums/showthread.php?t=37
>
> Marc,
>
> Thanks for sharing this. I'd not looked at the scope
> trace on a mag p-lead in many years. I thought the voltage
> was more on the order of 300v but that might be
> across the points of the distributor rotor in my
> 283 Chevy! Too long ago . . .
>
> Your data confirms that my suggestion to Vern offers
> a robust solution to his design goal.
>
> Busted 100 degrees down there yet?
>
>
> Bob . . .
>
> ---------------------------------------
> ( . . . a long habit of not thinking )
> ( a thing wrong, gives it a superficial )
> ( appearance of being right . . . )
> ( )
> ( -Thomas Paine 1776- )
> ---------------------------------------
>
>
>
Message 30
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| Subject: | Re: Magneto Switch Rating |
At 09:28 PM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
><rv-9a-online@telus.net>
>
>Bob, Marc, thanks for the info.
>
>Odd that in all the years, I've never seen a rating until Marc's
>reference. Seems to be lost in the folklore.
It probably has to do with the fact that about
any switch you pick up at the hardware store is
adequate to the task. The voltages are not much
higher than peak AC waveform on 120 vac and the
current is very nominal.
Not a big deal electrically. The J-3 I used to fly
had those little ball-end handles common to the
front panel of grandpa's radio and grandma's
electric fan.
Bob . . .
---------------------------------------
( . . . a long habit of not thinking )
( a thing wrong, gives it a superficial )
( appearance of being right . . . )
( )
( -Thomas Paine 1776- )
---------------------------------------
Message 31
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| Subject: | Re: 12 vs. 24 volt system |
At 06:41 PM 6/26/2009, you wrote:
>
>
>I am in the process of buying an engine. I am told by TCM, that the FADEC is
>only available in 24V and they are not supporting a 12V system. I have
>designed my aircraft for 12V, however other than some lights and my
>Hydraulic pump motor and pressurization outflow valve, everything else will
>work on 12/32V. Is there an easy way to convert the 24V to 12V for the
>hydraulic pump and outflow valve? The heavy user is the Hydraulic motor,
>calling for a 12V/50A fused supply. Any thoughts on doing a 24-12V high amp
>conversion would be appreciated.
Dual voltage band-aids are seldom very elegant.
Suggest you go fully 24v. The pump motor is easy
to swap out. How much current does the outflow
valve use. If on the order of 1A or less, a simple
series down-regulator is not too ugly.
Bob . . .
---------------------------------------
( . . . a long habit of not thinking )
( a thing wrong, gives it a superficial )
( appearance of being right . . . )
( )
( -Thomas Paine 1776- )
---------------------------------------
Message 32
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| Subject: | Re: Complex aircraft NTSB report |
Agreed, very troubling for the RV-10 community that suffered this and 2
weather related fatals in the same year. I don't see any facts in the
report relating to the electronic ignition for the Subaru engine, and
its power source, but it certainly makes one wonder if the crash was
initiated by loss of electrons to fire plugs and produce power, followed
by power off attempt at landing that unfortunately was not successful.
The mention of numerous unterminated wires does lead to head scratching.
KM
RV 10 #40866
Bob Collins wrote:
> As I build my RV, I also tend to want to have the rod end bearing jam
> nuts torqued down. Oh, and if a threaded rod breaks, I'll probably
> replace it rather than just stick it in with the broken part absent.
>
> The problem with many of us who knew Dan is that he was a good guy. A
> really nice guy.
>
> I certainly would want to look again at the DAR who signed off and I
> feel bad for the friends mentioned in the report who clearly tried to
> tell him a few things and I'm guessing they're kicking themselves for
> not being a little more direct.
>
> One tragedy WAS averted here. I believe Dan had planned to put his
> family in this plane later that day and fly to Boston.
>
> Let's be careful as we discuss this not to get too insulting toward Dan
> while learning from his death. It's a very difficult close-to-home story
> for those of us in the RV community.
>
> *
>
>
> *
Message 33
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| Subject: | COAXIAL CABLES recommendations |
Any recommendations for which coax can be used to wire the radio and the transponder
????
RG 400 - Standard cable for radio installations. Double shielded stranded
conductor, MIL-DTL-17 spec. Approved for certified aircraft.
PN 11-09202 $2.75 ($3.55AUD)
RG 142 - Low loss coax cable for GPS, TPX, and DME installations. Double shielded
solid conductor, MIL-C-17 spec. Approved for certified aircraft.
PN 11-00043 $2.95 ($3.80AUD)
RG 58A/U - Standard cable for experimental avionics installations. Single shielded
stranded conductor, jacket type PVC. For experimental aircraft only.
PN 11-03920 $0.46 ($0.59AUD)
RG 58C/U - Standard cable for experimental avionics installations. Single shielded
stranded conductor, jacket type Non-PVC. For experimental aircraft only.
PN 11-04258 $0.46 ($0.59AUD) Thanks
Read this topic online here:
http://forums.matronics.com/viewtopic.php?p=250288#250288
Message 34
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| Subject: | Re: Dual mags now...one Plasma II plus later |
I get it. I was thinking of the 1-2 swiches.
Pax,
Ed Holyoke
Robert L. Nuckolls, III wrote:
> <nuckolls.bob@aeroelectric.com>
>
> At 11:58 PM 6/25/2009, you wrote:
>> <bicyclop@pacbell.net>
>>
>> Yup, but you'll need to turn one of the switches over when you want
>> to use it to switch the ei. The mag switch closes to turn the mag
>> off, but the ei switch will close to turn on. You want the "up"
>> position to be on.
>
> No, the 1-3 switches are single pole, two position switches.
> They function for either breaking power to an electronic
> ignition -OR- grounding a magneto by simply moving a wire
> to the opposite terminal.
>
>
> Bob . . .
>
> ---------------------------------------
> ( . . . a long habit of not thinking )
> ( a thing wrong, gives it a superficial )
> ( appearance of being right . . . )
> ( )
> ( -Thomas Paine 1776- )
> ---------------------------------------
>
>
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