Today's Message Index:
----------------------
1. 02:54 AM - Trading Shares in Milliseconds (newastrums)
2. 09:50 AM - Re: The cost/benefit ratio for automation (jrevens)
3. 10:01 AM - Battery bulge ()
4. 01:38 PM - Re: Re: The cost/benefit ratio for automation (rayj)
5. 01:56 PM - Re: Re: intercom noise (was radio noise) (Sacha)
6. 03:10 PM - Re: intercom noise (was radio noise) (user9253)
7. 05:14 PM - Re: AeroElectric-List Digest: 8 Msgs - 08/27/14 (GLEN MATEJCEK)
Message 1
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Subject: | Trading Shares in Milliseconds |
If Manoj Narang is about to bring down the markets, hes certainly relaxed about
it. Narang, who wears a goatee and wire-frame glasses, is casually dressed in
a brown shirt and dark gray sweatshirt. Sitting on a swivel chair with one leg
tucked under the other, he seems positively composed, especially for a man who
has just bought and sold 15 million shares with a total value of $600 million.
For Narang, however, such volume represents just the start of a normal day.
Though its about noon on a Friday morning, he has barely begun.
Narang is the head of Tradeworx, a hedge fund and financial-technology firm that
makes purely automated trades; all decisions are reached and acted on at near
light speed by computers running preprogrammed algorithms. Actually, we run
two businesses, he says. The first trades in and out of shares in about a second
and holds them for an average of two or three days. Thats the medium-speed
fund. The high-speed fund could make thousands of trades a second and holds them
for a matter of minutes.
By
Jayanthi
Astrums (http://astrums.net/)
Read this topic online here:
http://forums.matronics.com/viewtopic.php?p=429511#429511
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Subject: | Re: The cost/benefit ratio for automation |
Bob,
I love your careful analysis of this issue. If approved, I would like to publish
a copy of your reply below in my EAA chapter 's newsletter (Chap. 43 in Denver,
CO) with credit to you and the List of course.
[quote="nuckolls.bob(at)aeroelect"]
>
> I have had an in flight fuel starvation event that was not resolved until
after a no power landing which was successful. I know from that experience that
a fog of confusion came over me and after replaying the event in my mind, I
could not recall the point that the aux fuel pump was turned on. I had been
through the drill many times to simulate an engine out emergency but I know for
me when it actually happened, I did not perform as well as I could/should
have. An automatic switching to the aux fuel pump could potentially take care
of a problem without me having to remember to do it in the event of the fog.
Of course I would want some indication of the switch occurring.
Airplanes, the individuals who ride in them and the circumstances of environment
through which the flight system moves offers infinite combinations of variables.
Some combinations add up in ways that increase risk, others will stack up in
ways that reduce risk. The core process for risk reduction is the failure modes
effects analysis. The oft repeated litany of questions to be asked/answered
are:
In what ways can this component fail?
How will that failure manifest?
Does failure create a condition from which recovery is difficult/impossible?
Can the failure "hide"? In other words, can the failure exist behind an inability
or unwillingness to pre-flight test for integrity?
If this failure has a high order of criticality, what steps can be taken to reduce
criticality and/or back it up?
Since the dawn of aviation, designers, builders and operators of airplanes have
wrestled with these questions. In some venues, individuals who know-more-about-airplanes-than-anybody
have decreed certain behaviors under force and penalty
of law. In every case, the justification for a proactive activity has been
to "Make airplanes SAFE for children and all living things."
Something we need to accept from square-one is that there is no such thing as
a SAFE airplane. Like chain saws, automobiles, ladders, lawn mowers ladles full
of molten steel . . . they are simply tools. Used within the boundaries of
acceptable risk, they can add a great deal to the quality of life . . . bump those
boundaries and life can become less than ideal . . . or get terminated.
It is an inarguable fact that the pilot is a core component of the flight system.
Pilots are human . . . subject by some degree to all of human-kinds weaknesses
including ignorance and ease of distraction. As complexity of the mission
grows, weak links in pilots inexorably drives up risk.
There have been countless experiences shared over suds and burgers (or Internet
forums) that cite close calls. I have skated onto thin ice more times than
I would like to recall . . . EACH instance involved a distraction from my training
and an abrogation of duty to first be a pilot . . . insofar as possible,
be one with my machine.
The benefits to be gained from automation are inarguable. Mooney proved this
many years ago with their Positive Control feature that was, for a time, standard
in all production airplanes. This was a vacuum servoed wing leveler that was
ON at all times. The device could be momentarily shut off by depressing a button
on the control yoke. Alternatively, control forces exerted by the pressure
limited servos were so light that the pilot could maneuver the airplane at
will whereupon automatic wing leveling would resume as soon as he turned loose
of the wheel.
What an elegant concept.
How many lives and airframes might have been saved if the Mooney PC concept was
standard equipment? At the same time, how would skills of the family of pilots
be diluted by the existence of such systems in ALL production aircraft?
I would not advise anyone to eschew some move to 'upgrade' the level of technology
in their airplane. At the same time, be cognizant of your first duty as
builder, system integrator and ultimately operator of the machine to consider
both the GAINS to be realized from the upgrade. Consider the potential for LOSSES
that may add more risk than you gained with the transistors.
Some innocuous thing like automatic pump control does not occur in a vacuum.
The little splash of technology on the panel has ripple that radiate outward .
. . the effects of such ripples may be small but are never zero.
Technology places a pilot in a kind of soft 'vise' being squeezed from one side
by a willingness to abrogate risk reduction to some piece of technology while
being squashed from the other side by a little chip of silicon. Any failure
in an array of 10,000 transistors reduces the chip's value to less than that
of pebble on the beach. Without a doubt, technology has offered quantum jumps
in risk reduction for operations while adding new risks in terms of both physical
failure of hardware and psychological failure of gray matter.
That vise squeezes oxygen from the brain's situational awareness and common sense
centers. Allowed to progress without restraint and we witness events like
a cockpit full of pilots flying a 777 full of people into the seawall on a CAVU
approach . . . or another cockpit full of pilots flying an L-1011 into the
swamp while chasing a light bulb failure.
Can anyone say "driverless cars"? I will suggest that the infinite combinations
of variables I cited at the opening of this missive is best managed by educated
and attentive gray matter . . . aided by things like check-lists.
Bob . . .
> [b]
--------
John Evens
Read this topic online here:
http://forums.matronics.com/viewtopic.php?p=429524#429524
Message 3
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My comments to a friend started the recent battery thread on this list. During
an annual on my Glasair I noticed a bulge on the firewall mounted battery which
was three inches in diameter and about 3/16 inches high. I replaced the battery
with a new one, and after only one hour of flight time the new battery developed
a similar bulge. For fifteen years I've followed Bob's advice to replace
the battery every year, and I've never had a problem until the last two batteries.
They were BatteryPlus (Weiker, 12v, 32 amphr, regular batteries, cost
about $80), but the last two batteries were "deep cycle". The cooling air
flow has not been altered; the 60 amp alternator still produces 14.4 volts and
the ammeter seems normal. Question: could my problem be the "deep cycle" property
of the last two batteries? Thanks, Bob in Virginia. END
Message 4
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Subject: | Re: The cost/benefit ratio for automation |
I was wondering about automatic fire extinguishers and whether or not
this philosophy might be applied to them.
Raymond Julian
Kettle River, MN
The things we admire in men, kindness and generosity, openness, honesty,
understanding and feeling are the concomitants of failure in our system.
And those traits we detest, sharpness, greed, acquisitiveness, meanness,
egotism and self-interest are the traits of success. And while men
admire the quality of the first they love the produce of the second.
-John Steinbeck, novelist, Nobel laureate (1902-1968)
On 08/28/2014 11:49 AM, jrevens wrote:
>
> Bob,
> I love your careful analysis of this issue. If approved, I would like to publish
a copy of your reply below in my EAA chapter 's newsletter (Chap. 43 in Denver,
CO) with credit to you and the List of course.
>
> [quote="nuckolls.bob(at)aeroelect"]
>>
>> I have had an in flight fuel starvation event that was not resolved until
after a no power landing which was successful. I know from that experience that
a fog of confusion came over me and after replaying the event in my mind,
I could not recall the point that the aux fuel pump was turned on. I had been
through the drill many times to simulate an engine out emergency but I know
for me when it actually happened, I did not perform as well as I could/should
have. An automatic switching to the aux fuel pump could potentially take care
of a problem without me having to remember to do it in the event of the fog.
Of course I would want some indication of the switch occurring.
>
>
> Airplanes, the individuals who ride in them and the circumstances of environment
through which the flight system moves offers infinite combinations of variables.
>
> Some combinations add up in ways that increase risk, others will stack up
in ways that reduce risk. The core process for risk reduction is the failure modes
effects analysis. The oft repeated litany of questions to be asked/answered
are:
>
> In what ways can this component fail?
>
> How will that failure manifest?
>
> Does failure create a condition from which recovery is difficult/impossible?
>
> Can the failure "hide"? In other words, can the failure exist behind an inability
or unwillingness to pre-flight test for integrity?
>
> If this failure has a high order of criticality, what steps can be taken to
reduce criticality and/or back it up?
>
> Since the dawn of aviation, designers, builders and operators of airplanes
have wrestled with these questions. In some venues, individuals who know-more-about-airplanes-than-anybody
have decreed certain behaviors under force and penalty
of law. In every case, the justification for a proactive activity has been
to "Make airplanes SAFE for children and all living things."
>
> Something we need to accept from square-one is that there is no such thing
as a SAFE airplane. Like chain saws, automobiles, ladders, lawn mowers ladles
full of molten steel . . . they are simply tools. Used within the boundaries
of acceptable risk, they can add a great deal to the quality of life . . . bump
those boundaries and life can become less than ideal . . . or get terminated.
>
> It is an inarguable fact that the pilot is a core component of the flight
system. Pilots are human . . . subject by some degree to all of human-kinds weaknesses
including ignorance and ease of distraction. As complexity of the mission
grows, weak links in pilots inexorably drives up risk.
>
> There have been countless experiences shared over suds and burgers (or Internet
forums) that cite close calls. I have skated onto thin ice more times than
I would like to recall . . . EACH instance involved a distraction from my training
and an abrogation of duty to first be a pilot . . . insofar as possible,
be one with my machine.
>
> The benefits to be gained from automation are inarguable. Mooney proved this
many years ago with their Positive Control feature that was, for a time, standard
in all production airplanes. This was a vacuum servoed wing leveler that
was ON at all times. The device could be momentarily shut off by depressing
a button on the control yoke. Alternatively, control forces exerted by the pressure
limited servos were so light that the pilot could maneuver the airplane
at will whereupon automatic wing leveling would resume as soon as he turned loose
of the wheel.
>
> What an elegant concept.
>
> How many lives and airframes might have been saved if the Mooney PC concept
was standard equipment? At the same time, how would skills of the family of
pilots be diluted by the existence of such systems in ALL production aircraft?
>
> I would not advise anyone to eschew some move to 'upgrade' the level of technology
in their airplane. At the same time, be cognizant of your first duty
as builder, system integrator and ultimately operator of the machine to consider
both the GAINS to be realized from the upgrade. Consider the potential for
LOSSES that may add more risk than you gained with the transistors.
>
> Some innocuous thing like automatic pump control does not occur in a vacuum.
The little splash of technology on the panel has ripple that radiate outward
. . . the effects of such ripples may be small but are never zero.
>
>
> Technology places a pilot in a kind of soft 'vise' being squeezed from one
side by a willingness to abrogate risk reduction to some piece of technology
while being squashed from the other side by a little chip of silicon. Any failure
in an array of 10,000 transistors reduces the chip's value to less than that
of pebble on the beach. Without a doubt, technology has offered quantum jumps
in risk reduction for operations while adding new risks in terms of both physical
failure of hardware and psychological failure of gray matter.
>
> That vise squeezes oxygen from the brain's situational awareness and common
sense centers. Allowed to progress without restraint and we witness events like
a cockpit full of pilots flying a 777 full of people into the seawall on a
CAVU approach . . . or another cockpit full of pilots flying an L-1011 into the
swamp while chasing a light bulb failure.
>
> Can anyone say "driverless cars"? I will suggest that the infinite combinations
of variables I cited at the opening of this missive is best managed by educated
and attentive gray matter . . . aided by things like check-lists.
>
>
> Bob . . .
>> [b]
>
>
> --------
> John Evens
>
>
> Read this topic online here:
>
> http://forums.matronics.com/viewtopic.php?p=429524#429524
>
>
Message 5
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Subject: | Re: intercom noise (was radio noise) |
Joe,
I can confirm that you hit the nail on the head. Yesterday and today I
unplugged the copilot headset and the intercom squelch problem went away.
Thank you again!
Sacha
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-aeroelectric-list-server@matronics.com
[mailto:owner-aeroelectric-list-server@matronics.com] On Behalf Of user9253
Sent: Saturday, 23 August, 2014 14:19
Subject: AeroElectric-List: Re: intercom noise (was radio noise)
Breaking the radio squelch would not make it more difficult to hear incoming
radio transmissions. The symptoms that you describe are from breaking the
intercom squelch. The white noise is cockpit noise. As the engine RPM
increases, the cockpit noise increases until it reaches a point where the
intercom squelch is broken. Try adjusting the intercom squelch at cruise
RPM using the large knobs, left knob for pilot and right knob for copilot.
Joe
--------
Joe Gores
Read this topic online here:
http://forums.matronics.com/viewtopic.php?p=429163#429163
Message 6
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Subject: | Re: intercom noise (was radio noise) |
You are welcome, Sacha.
Do not archive
Joe
--------
Joe Gores
Read this topic online here:
http://forums.matronics.com/viewtopic.php?p=429554#429554
Message 7
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Subject: | Re: AeroElectric-List Digest: 8 Msgs - 08/27/14 |
Hi Bob S; that was intended for Bob K.
>Subject: Re: AeroElectric-List: Speaking of battery issues...
>
>Evidently I did not as I do not recall it at all! ?!
>
>Happy Skies,
>
>Old Bob
In a message dated 8/27/2014 3:06:06 A.M. Central Daylight Time,
fly4grins@gmail.com writes:
Hi Bob-
Were you ever able to glean anything from the Battery Tender Jr I sent you
some time back?
Tnx-
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