Commander-List Digest Archive

Sat 01/22/11


Total Messages Posted: 5



Today's Message Index:
----------------------
 
     1. 12:10 PM - IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue (dongirod)
     2. 03:58 PM - Re: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue (William J Hamilton)
     3. 05:34 PM - Re: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue (Deneal Schilmeister (MacbookPro))
     4. 06:03 PM - FW: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue (Deneal Schilmeister (MacbookPro))
     5. 08:00 PM - Re: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue (cybersuperstore)
 
 
 


Message 1


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    Time: 12:10:54 PM PST US
    From: "dongirod" <dongirod@bellsouth.net>
    Subject: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue
    I got this from a friend, not sure of any of the info, but thought it might be interesting to some on the list. Don Subject: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue Here is a review written by IFALPA after they looked at the stuff that's so far come out of the QF A380 incident. As far as "Fly-by-Wire" and redundancy go it really doesn't matter how many wires you have going to an item if they are all routed thru the same area! Airbus and Rolls have some serious redesign work ahead of them. It also poses some really troubling questions that have the potential to shake up the entire system from certification authorities through regulators, through airline training departments. It also blows away the Airbus mantra that their jets are so smart that you can stuff an inexperienced crew from Nigeria in the cockpit, and as long as they can keep the wings level until the A/P is turned on, and then slavishly follow what the totally brilliant and foolproof ECAM system tells them is wrong and what to do in what order, all will be well....[Amen to this comment] Qantas A380 Uncontained Engine Failure Background On Thursday 4th November a Qantas A380, registration VH-OQA suffered an uncontained intermediate pressure turbine wheel failure of the No 2 engine at about 6000 feet on departure from Singapore. The aircraft returned for landing safely but the crew had around 54 ECAM messages to deal with and a substantial loss of systems on board the aircraft. It took about an hour to deal with all those messages. There were, and are, a number of Airworthiness Directives out on the engine for inspection; some are new and some are from previous problems. The issue appears to be oil leaking from the bearing into the Intermediate Pressure/High Pressure turbine wheel structural area causing an intense local fire that compromised the structure of the turbines. The aircraft was substantially damaged but landed safely. Systems Loss and Damage Synopsis: Investigations are ongoing and there is much speculation in the media and around the industry but the major issue for the ADO committee to consider is the secondary damage and systems loss that the aircraft suffered. A brief description follows of the known, and public, issues: =A2 The No 2 engine suffered an uncontained failure of IP rotor which separated from the engine and penetrated the wing and body fairing of the aircraft. =A2 The rotor penetrated the forward wing spar and exited the upper surface of the wing. =A2 The main electrical loom in forward section of wing was cut causing loss of engine control (thrust ok) on No 1 and no ability to shut it down with Fire Handle. =A2 The power drive unit for the leading edge devices was severed in the same location, =A2 The crew were unable to discharge any fire bottles for engine No 1 and No 2. =A2 All electrical hydraulic pumps that side were lost. =A2 A piece of rotor penetrated the body fairing and severed a wiring loom in that location. =A2 Another piece of the rotor damaged the aft fuel transfer gallery and caused leaks in the left mid and inner fuel feed tanks =93 one of which was substantial. This led to a lateral imbalance problem. =A2 The crew were unable to jettison or transfer fuel forward. This led to indications of an aft cg problem. =A2 Emergency Outer tank transfer only resulted in the right hand outer tank transferring =93 the left hand tank failed to transfer - this helped the lateral imbalance. =A2 There was damage to the fairing housing the RAT, flaps and flap track fairings. =A2 Total loss of the Green hydraulic system, =A2 ECAM indicated loss of both electrical hydraulic pumps on No 4 engine (Yellow system). =A2 Landing Gear required gravity extension. =A2 No anti skid on wing gear hence only emergency brakes; body gear braking normal =A2 Engines 1 and 4 indicating =98degraded mode=99 =93 which means no N-1 rating limit. Requires all engines to be switched to =98Alternate=99 mode with a 4% maximum thrust loss. =A2 AC bus 1&2 failed. =A2 No 2 engine electrical generator failed as a result of the engine failure =A2 The APU was started but the crew were unable to connect the APU bleed air or the generators to the bus system. =A2 No 1 air conditioning pack failed. =A2 Autothrust was not available. =A2 The satellite phone system would not work. ECAM Management: When the failure occurred something like 54 ECAM messages appeared on the screen. These set off the Master Warning and Master Caution many times; to the point of distraction of the crew. The First Office started the stop watch when the first master warning went off and from there it took the crew 50 minutes or so to clear the messages down to the Status page. Management of the ECAM was an issue with the ECAM calling for a transfer of fuel into obviously leaking tanks to cure a fuel imbalance. Forward transfer was also not possible which generated an ECAM for an aft CG problem that could not be rectified. The ECAM also called for a Fuel Quantity Management System reset which, when carried out, regenerated all the error messages. For non - Airbus pilots the Status page is normally where ECAM actions are stopped and Normal checklists are used, Operational Engineering Bulletins are considered, resets to recover systems are attempted and any pilot initiated abnormal checklists are used. Preparation for Landing: It took the crew some time to prepare the aircraft for landing. The Landing Performance Application of the Electronic Flight Bag did not appear to generate correct information which resulted in the crew carefully entering eight landing alerts and recalculating the landing performance. The end result was that the predicted approach speed was around 167 knots and landing distance 3850 meters on the 4000 meter runway. Aircraft handling checks were carried out in both the clean and landing configuration with adequate control response and margin demonstrated. This was despite a lateral imbalance of around 10 tonnes and a message indicating an aft cg issue. Landing: Given the loss of hydraulics the aircraft was in a degraded mode with only one aileron working on one wing and two on the other with limited spoiler capability. Autothrust was not available and manual thrust was used with the engines in the alternate mode. Also no leading edge slats were available and the gear had to be extended by gravity. Despite this the approach to landing went as planned expect for a =9CSpeed, Speed=9D call by the warning system. The reason for this is unknown but it was cancelled by thrust application. Touchdown was reported as very smooth and the aircraft speed was brought under control with about 600 metres to run. The aircraft was allowed to roll near to the end runway to position it near the fire trucks. When the aircraft finally stopped the brake temperatures quickly rose to 900 degrees and a few tires deflated. Post landing: When the aircraft stopped the crew attempted to shut down the No 1 engine but were unable to do so with either the fuel switch or the engine fire handle. Fuel was leaking from the left hand wing and pooling around the hot brakes. The fire crew were organized to smother the fuel with foam and the decision was made not to evacuate the aircraft given the running engine, the pooling fuel, the potential for serious injuries and the presence of the fire crews who were attempting to stop the No 1 engine by running a stream of water down the intake. When the engines were finally shut down the aircraft went =9Cdark=9D due to the inability to connect the APU generators to the bus system.. ------------------------------------------------------ Issues for Consideration: This event raises a number of issues for consideration by the ADO committee, Rolls Royce, Airbus and the industry in general. There is no doubt that the aircraft was badly damaged by the IP rotor burst. In fact, it is fortunate that this incident did not end up like the DC-10 in Sioux City Iowa [Or American at O'Hare]. >From an aircraft damage tolerance point of view it is a tribute to the A380, modern design criteria and the redundancy available later generation aircraft. Certainly the fact that the very experienced crew consisted of three Captains, a highly experienced First Officer and a very experienced ex-military Second Officer enabled tasks to be shared including flying the aircraft, dealing with the huge amount of ECAM messages, communication and performance calculations. The First Officer managed the ECAM and, at times, decisions were made to ignore or not do certain ECAM procedures that did not seem logical such as transferring fuel into leaking tanks. It is worth noting that there were three captains present because the Pilot-in-Command was being Annual Route checked by a trainee Check Captain who was being supervised by another Check Captain. Without going into significant explanatory detail the following poses the following questions for consideration: Design: =A2 Given this and a number of other uncontained turbine rotor failures should transport category aircraft be designed to withstand an engine rotor burst? Or is this impracticable? =A2 Conversely, is it possible to design for rotor containment or mitigation by the engine in the event of a burst? =A2 Can engine monitoring systems be developed to warn of an impending catastrophic failure? (e.g. a combination of vibration/ rapid core temperature changes/parameters out of limits) =A2 Rolls Royce have mentioned engine self protection systems to shut down engines in order to minimise the effect of a rotor burst. How would that be implemented? Would warning be given? How critical would an unexpected shutdown be? What would the false warning rate be? =A2 Why did some apparently unrelated systems fail in this incident? (e.g. Yellow system hydraulic pumps on engine No 4) Is there a common data management source that is failing under overload or was it damaged in the incident? =A2 Are modern aircraft so complex that failures tend to be multi-modal and thus confusing to the crew? =A2 If an electrical loom to an engine is cut the fail safe mode is to run on. What if the engine runs on at high thrust? =A2 If there had been an engine fire the crew would not have been able to use the fire bottles because of the cut loom. Is this system truly redundant and effective? =A2 Given the loss of systems in the wing should the main electrical loom be relocated or systems separated to a secondary loom to improve redundancy? =A2 The crew were unable to transfer fuel and there was a substantial fuel leak from the left wing. What if these failures had occurred in mid ocean? Operational Philosophy: =A2 There were many ECAM messages occurring in the initial failure. The constant alerts were distracting and the need to cancel them detracted from the procedures.. Should a semi-permanent cancel mode be available? The crew know they have a problem. =A2 Did the ECAM correctly prioritise the alerts? Probably not known at this stage but certainly a few ECAM messages appeared incorrect in the circumstances (e.g. Fuel transfer into leaking tanks for imbalance). =A2 Is the modern trend to complete all ECAM/EICAS actions too time consuming and distracting to the crew to the detriment of prioritising the flying of the aircraft and the landing? =A2 Should there be an abbreviated ECAM/EICAS procedure that achieves a safe mode for landing in the event of an emergency return? =A2 Is modern aircraft operational philosophy too automation and functional system reliant? Training and Experience: =A2 This was highly experienced crew. Should this type of failure be considered when pairing a 240 hour MPL or cadet pilot graduate with a relatively new Captain? Or is the probability too remote and thus acceptable? =A2 The crew reported in this case that crew resource management was very effective and that there was zero cockpit gradient. The crew were adaptive in dealing with the multiple and complicated ECAM messages. Should crew resource training be modified to include crew recognition of the extreme nature of the emergency and thus to not slavishly follow checklist procedures to the detriment of a timely return to landing? =A2 Given the move to evidence based training should training scenarios include multi-mode failures so that crews can cope with unusual events or are they so rare as not to warrant this type of training? Conclusion: This incident could easily have been an accident; many of the systems failures the crew had to deal with would be classed as an emergency on their own (e.g. uncontained engine failure, loss of hydraulics, multiple bus failures and leading edge failure) let alone in combination. The fact that it wasn=99t an accident is probably testament to the redundancy built into the A380 design and it is certainly due to the training and competency of a very experienced crew operating in a team environment. There are many positive lessons to be learned from this event. Captain Richard Woodward Executive Vice President Technical Standards IFALPA


    Message 2


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    Time: 03:58:19 PM PST US
    From: William J Hamilton <wjrhamilton@optusnet.com.au>
    Subject: Re: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue
    > dongirod <dongirod@bellsouth.net> wrote: > > I got this from a friend, not sure of any of the info, but thought it > might be interesting to some on the list. > > Don > > > > Subject: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue > > Here is a review written by IFALPA after they looked at the stuff that's > > so far come out of the QF A380 incident. > > As far as "Fly-by-Wire" and redundancy go it really doesn't matter how > many wires you have going to an item if they are all routed thru the > same > area! Airbus and Rolls have some serious redesign work ahead of them. > > It also poses some really troubling questions that have the potential to > > shake up the entire system from certification authorities through > regulators, through airline training departments. It also blows away the > Airbus > mantra that their jets are so smart that you can stuff an inexperienced > crew > from Nigeria in the cockpit, and as long as they can keep the wings > level > until the A/P is turned on, and then slavishly follow what the totally > brilliant and foolproof ECAM system tells them is wrong and what to do > in what > order, all will be well....[Amen to this comment] > > Qantas A380 Uncontained Engine Failure > Background > On Thursday 4th November a Qantas A380, registration VH-OQA suffered an > uncontained intermediate pressure turbine wheel failure of the No 2 > engine at > about 6000 feet on departure from Singapore. The aircraft returned for > landing safely but the crew had around 54 ECAM messages to deal with and > a > substantial loss of systems on board the aircraft. It took about an hour > to > deal with all those messages. > There were, and are, a number of Airworthiness Directives out on the > engine for inspection; some are new and some are from previous problems. > The > issue appears to be oil leaking from the bearing into the Intermediate > Pressure/High Pressure turbine wheel structural area causing an intense > local > fire that compromised the structure of the turbines. > The aircraft was substantially damaged but landed safely. > > Systems Loss and Damage Synopsis: > Investigations are ongoing and there is much speculation in the media > and > around the industry but the major issue for the ADO committee to > consider > is the secondary damage and systems loss that the aircraft suffered. > > A brief description follows of the known, and public, issues: > The No 2 engine suffered an uncontained failure of IP rotor which > separated from the engine and penetrated the wing and body fairing of > the > aircraft. > The rotor penetrated the forward wing spar and exited the upper > surface > of the wing. > The main electrical loom in forward section of wing was cut causing > loss > of engine control (thrust ok) on No 1 and no ability to shut it down > with > Fire Handle. > The power drive unit for the leading edge devices was severed in the > > same location, > The crew were unable to discharge any fire bottles for engine No 1 > and > No 2. > All electrical hydraulic pumps that side were lost. > A piece of rotor penetrated the body fairing and severed a wiring > loom > in that location. > Another piece of the rotor damaged the aft fuel transfer gallery and > > caused leaks in the left mid and inner fuel feed tanks one of which > was > substantial. This led to a lateral imbalance problem. > The crew were unable to jettison or transfer fuel forward. This led > to > indications of an aft cg problem. > Emergency Outer tank transfer only resulted in the right hand outer > tank transferring the left hand tank failed to transfer - this > helped the > lateral imbalance. > There was damage to the fairing housing the RAT, flaps and flap > track > fairings. > Total loss of the Green hydraulic system, > ECAM indicated loss of both electrical hydraulic pumps on No 4 > engine > (Yellow system). > Landing Gear required gravity extension. > No anti skid on wing gear hence only emergency brakes; body gear > braking > normal > Engines 1 and 4 indicating degraded mode which means no > N-1 > rating limit. Requires all engines to be switched to Alternate > mode with a 4% > maximum thrust loss. > AC bus 1&2 failed. > No 2 engine electrical generator failed as a result of the engine > failure > The APU was started but the crew were unable to connect the APU > bleed > air or the generators to the bus system. > No 1 air conditioning pack failed. > Autothrust was not available. > The satellite phone system would not work. > > ECAM Management: > When the failure occurred something like 54 ECAM messages appeared on > the > screen. These set off the Master Warning and Master Caution many times; > to > the point of distraction of the crew. The First Office started the stop > watch when the first master warning went off and from there it took the > crew > 50 minutes or so to clear the messages down to the Status page. > Management > of the ECAM was an issue with the ECAM calling for a transfer of fuel > into > obviously leaking tanks to cure a fuel imbalance. Forward transfer was > also > not possible which generated an ECAM for an aft CG problem that could > not > be rectified. The ECAM also called for a Fuel Quantity Management System > > reset which, when carried out, regenerated all the error messages. For > non - > Airbus pilots the Status page is normally where ECAM actions are stopped > > and Normal checklists are used, Operational Engineering Bulletins are > considered, resets to recover systems are attempted and any pilot > initiated > abnormal checklists are used. > > Preparation for Landing: > It took the crew some time to prepare the aircraft for landing. The > Landing Performance Application of the Electronic Flight Bag did not > appear to > generate correct information which resulted in the crew carefully > entering > eight landing alerts and recalculating the landing performance. The end > result was that the predicted approach speed was around 167 knots and > landing > distance 3850 meters on the 4000 meter runway. Aircraft handling checks > were > carried out in both the clean and landing configuration with adequate > control response and margin demonstrated. This was despite a lateral > imbalance > of around 10 tonnes and a message indicating an aft cg issue. > > Landing: > Given the loss of hydraulics the aircraft was in a degraded mode with > only > one aileron working on one wing and two on the other with limited > spoiler > capability. Autothrust was not available and manual thrust was used with > > the engines in the alternate mode. Also no leading edge slats were > available > and the gear had to be extended by gravity. Despite this the approach to > > landing went as planned expect for a Speed, Speed call by the > warning > system. The reason for this is unknown but it was cancelled by thrust > application. Touchdown was reported as very smooth and the aircraft > speed was > brought under control with about 600 metres to run. The aircraft was > allowed to > roll near to the end runway to position it near the fire trucks. When > the > aircraft finally stopped the brake temperatures quickly rose to 900 > degrees > and a few tires deflated. > > Post landing: > When the aircraft stopped the crew attempted to shut down the No 1 > engine > but were unable to do so with either the fuel switch or the engine fire > handle. Fuel was leaking from the left hand wing and pooling around the > hot > brakes. The fire crew were organized to smother the fuel with foam and > the > decision was made not to evacuate the aircraft given the running engine, > the > pooling fuel, the potential for serious injuries and the presence of the > > fire crews who were attempting to stop the No 1 engine by running a > stream > of water down the intake. When the engines were finally shut down the > aircraft went dark due to the inability to connect the APU > generators to the > bus system.. > ------------------------------------------------------ > > Issues for Consideration: > This event raises a number of issues for consideration by the ADO > committee, Rolls Royce, Airbus and the industry in general. There is no > doubt that > the aircraft was badly damaged by the IP rotor burst. In fact, it is > fortunate that this incident did not end up like the DC-10 in Sioux City > Iowa [Or > American at O'Hare]. >From an aircraft damage tolerance point of view it > > is a tribute to the A380, modern design criteria and the redundancy > available later generation aircraft. Certainly the fact that the very > experienced > crew consisted of three Captains, a highly experienced First Officer and > a > very experienced ex-military Second Officer enabled tasks to be shared > including flying the aircraft, dealing with the huge amount of ECAM > messages, > communication and performance calculations. The First Officer managed > the > ECAM and, at times, decisions were made to ignore or not do certain ECAM > > procedures that did not seem logical such as transferring fuel into > leaking > tanks. It is worth noting that there were three captains present because > the > Pilot-in-Command was being Annual Route checked by a trainee Check > Captain > who was being supervised by another Check Captain. > > Without going into significant explanatory detail the following poses > the > following questions for consideration: > > Design: > Given this and a number of other uncontained turbine rotor failures > should transport category aircraft be designed to withstand an engine > rotor > burst? Or is this impracticable? > Conversely, is it possible to design for rotor containment or > mitigation > by the engine in the event of a burst? > Can engine monitoring systems be developed to warn of an impending > catastrophic failure? (e.g. a combination of vibration/ rapid core > temperature > changes/parameters out of limits) > Rolls Royce have mentioned engine self protection systems to shut > down > engines in order to minimise the effect of a rotor burst. How would that > be > implemented? Would warning be given? How critical would an unexpected > shutdown be? What would the false warning rate be? > Why did some apparently unrelated systems fail in this incident? > (e.g. > Yellow system hydraulic pumps on engine No 4) Is there a common data > management source that is failing under overload or was it damaged in > the > incident? > Are modern aircraft so complex that failures tend to be multi-modal > and > thus confusing to the crew? > If an electrical loom to an engine is cut the fail safe mode is to > run > on. What if the engine runs on at high thrust? > If there had been an engine fire the crew would not have been able > to > use the fire bottles because of the cut loom. Is this system truly > redundant > and effective? > Given the loss of systems in the wing should the main electrical > loom be > relocated or systems separated to a secondary loom to improve > redundancy? > The crew were unable to transfer fuel and there was a substantial > fuel > leak from the left wing. What if these failures had occurred in mid > ocean? > > Operational Philosophy: > There were many ECAM messages occurring in the initial failure. The > constant alerts were distracting and the need to cancel them detracted > from the > procedures.. Should a semi-permanent cancel mode be available? The crew > know they have a problem. > Did the ECAM correctly prioritise the alerts? Probably not known at > this > stage but certainly a few ECAM messages appeared incorrect in the > circumstances (e.g. Fuel transfer into leaking tanks for imbalance). > Is the modern trend to complete all ECAM/EICAS actions too time > consuming and distracting to the crew to the detriment of prioritising > the flying > of the aircraft and the landing? > Should there be an abbreviated ECAM/EICAS procedure that achieves a > safe > mode for landing in the event of an emergency return? > Is modern aircraft operational philosophy too automation and > functional > system reliant? > > Training and Experience: > This was highly experienced crew. Should this type of failure be > considered when pairing a 240 hour MPL or cadet pilot graduate with a > relatively > new Captain? Or is the probability too remote and thus acceptable? > The crew reported in this case that crew resource management was > very > effective and that there was zero cockpit gradient. The crew were > adaptive in > dealing with the multiple and complicated ECAM messages. Should crew > resource training be modified to include crew recognition of the extreme > nature > of the emergency and thus to not slavishly follow checklist procedures > to > the detriment of a timely return to landing? > Given the move to evidence based training should training scenarios > include multi-mode failures so that crews can cope with unusual events > or are > they so rare as not to warrant this type of training? > > Conclusion: > This incident could easily have been an accident; many of the systems > failures the crew had to deal with would be classed as an emergency on > their > own (e.g. uncontained engine failure, loss of hydraulics, multiple bus > failures and leading edge failure) let alone in combination. The fact > that it > wasnt an accident is probably testament to the redundancy built into > the > A380 design and it is certainly due to the training and competency of a > very > experienced crew operating in a team environment. There are many > positive > lessons to be learned from this event. > > Captain Richard Woodward > Executive Vice President Technical Standards > IFALPA Folks, The IFALPA VP who wrote this is also a QANTAS captain. The details are correct, if abbreviated, the complete analysis of the interacting multiple failures are not yet complete, but the limitations of the "computer knows best" Airbus approach is showing its limitations here. As another QF mate of mine said of Airbus: "Its all about democracy, and the computers have 51% of the vote". For those of you familiar with the B777, in a "apples and apples" event in the 777, the likely cockpit complications would be considerably less. The normal crew for the A380 is still two pilots, with an event such as this, life for two pilots would have been very busy. One comment, about cockpit authority gradient, a flat (indeed almost non-existent) gradient is almost achieved in QANTAS, it certainly helps. I know all the crew involved, except the S/O, two are ex-students of mine ( the supervising Senior Check and the operating Captain) and it is clear even to the detractors of the "real" QANTAS, that the crew and years of training showed. This is not stopping the senior management (none are pilots or engineers) dumbing down the flight operation, indeed it seems much of the operation is gradually being moved to Singapore, initially the Jetstar division, to be operated by short term contract pilots, with training being done by outside contractors. Once again, accountants can tell you the cost of everything, but the value of nothing. Regards, Bill Hamilton QF Check and Training Captain, retired.


    Message 3


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    Time: 05:34:11 PM PST US
    Subject: Re: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue
    From: "Deneal Schilmeister (MacbookPro)" <deneals@deneals.com>
    Here are comments (in bold) I received after I forwarded that report to a "mate" of mine that is an Airbus capt for UPS (also ex- Central Air): " Is the modern trend to complete all ECAM/EICAS actions too time consuming and distracting to the crew to the detriment of prioritising the flying of the aircraft and the landing? *YES* Should there be an abbreviated ECAM/EICAS procedure that achieves a safe mode for landing in the event of an emergency return? *I would just ignore the ecam, Land asap and make sure the gear is down before touchdown. *I've found many scenarios in Sim training where the ECAM becomes a burden. When you're done with the ECAM items, you still have to supplement it with the paper checklist and figure out the proper point to enter the checklist. We have 6 known anomaly's on our A300's that we are told to ignore. I would rather use the Paper checklist and forget about ECAM. On 1/22/11 5:55 PM, "William J Hamilton" <wjrhamilton@optusnet.com.au> wrote: > Folks, > The IFALPA VP who wrote this is also a QANTAS captain. > > The details are correct, if abbreviated, the complete analysis of the > interacting multiple failures are not yet complete, but the limitations o f the > "computer knows best" Airbus approach is showing its limitations here. > > As another QF mate of mine said of Airbus: "Its all about democracy, and the > computers have 51% of the vote". > > For those of you familiar with the B777, in a "apples and apples" event i n the > 777, the likely cockpit complications would be considerably less. > > The normal crew for the A380 is still two pilots, with an event such as t his, > life for two pilots would have been very busy. > > One comment, about cockpit authority gradient, a flat (indeed almost > non-existent) gradient is almost achieved in QANTAS, it certainly helps. > > I know all the crew involved, except the S/O, two are ex-students of mine ( > the supervising Senior Check and the operating Captain) and it is clear e ven > to the detractors of the "real" QANTAS, that the crew and years of traini ng > showed. > > This is not stopping the senior management (none are pilots or engineers) > dumbing down the flight operation, indeed it seems much of the operation is > gradually being moved to Singapore, initially the Jetstar division, to be > operated by short term contract pilots, with training being done by outsi de > contractors. > > Once again, accountants can tell you the cost of everything, but the valu e of > nothing. > > Regards, > Bill Hamilton > QF Check and Training Captain, retired.


    Message 4


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    Time: 06:03:25 PM PST US
    Subject: FW: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue
    From: "Deneal Schilmeister (MacbookPro)" <deneals@deneals.com>
    Here are comments I received after I forwarded that report to a "mate" of mine that recently retired as a manager in Boeing=B9s (nee McDonnell Douglas=B9 ) Phantom Works: ------ Forwarded Message Great report. Really interesting =AD fascinating. Here are a few of my thoughts: * You can contain blade failures, but not rotor failures. I have first hand experience with two rotor failures =AD F100 engine #169 which failed on the test stand at St. Louis, and an F404 engine in F-18 TF2 that failed in flight and took out the other engine, causing loss of the aircraft. The pilots, Garry Post and ???, both survived. Rotors always fail in thirds, an d the energy of the failed components is so incredible that the weight associated with containment is prohibitive. * These guys were damn lucky in addition to being highly skilled. A lesser skilled crew probably would not have brought the aircraft back. It was incredibly fortunate that there were three Captains onboard =AD what are the odds of that? * Not to pick on Airbus, but I don=B9t understand how taking out one wire bundle could cause the loss of function. The spec as I remember is that redundant wire bundles have to be routed a minimum of 18 inches apart. Thanks for sharing! ------ End of Forwarded Message


    Message 5


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    Time: 08:00:04 PM PST US
    From: "cybersuperstore" <nico@cybersuperstore.com>
    Subject: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue
    Hi Don, Thanks for forwarding. Fascinating reading. Nico _____ From: owner-commander-list-server@matronics.com [mailto:owner-commander-list-server@matronics.com] On Behalf Of dongirod Sent: Saturday, January 22, 2011 12:08 PM Subject: Commander-List: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue I got this from a friend, not sure of any of the info, but thought it might be interesting to some on the list. Don Subject: IFALPA's take on the A380 Issue Here is a review written by IFALPA after they looked at the stuff that's so far come out of the QF A380 incident. As far as "Fly-by-Wire" and redundancy go it really doesn't matter how many wires you have going to an item if they are all routed thru the same area! Airbus and Rolls have some serious redesign work ahead of them. It also poses some really troubling questions that have the potential to shake up the entire system from certification authorities through regulators, through airline training departments. It also blows away the Airbus mantra that their jets are so smart that you can stuff an inexperienced crew from Nigeria in the cockpit, and as long as they can keep the wings level until the A/P is turned on, and then slavishly follow what the totally brilliant and foolproof ECAM system tells them is wrong and what to do in what order, all will be well....[Amen to this comment] Qantas A380 Uncontained Engine Failure Background On Thursday 4th November a Qantas A380, registration VH-OQA suffered an uncontained intermediate pressure turbine wheel failure of the No 2 engine at about 6000 feet on departure from Singapore. The aircraft returned for landing safely but the crew had around 54 ECAM messages to deal with and a substantial loss of systems on board the aircraft. It took about an hour to deal with all those messages. There were, and are, a number of Airworthiness Directives out on the engine for inspection; some are new and some are from previous problems. The issue appears to be oil leaking from the bearing into the Intermediate Pressure/High Pressure turbine wheel structural area causing an intense local fire that compromised the structure of the turbines. The aircraft was substantially damaged but landed safely. Systems Loss and Damage Synopsis: Investigations are ongoing and there is much speculation in the media and around the industry but the major issue for the ADO committee to consider is the secondary damage and systems loss that the aircraft suffered. A brief description follows of the known, and public, issues: . The No 2 engine suffered an uncontained failure of IP rotor which separated from the engine and penetrated the wing and body fairing of the aircraft. . The rotor penetrated the forward wing spar and exited the upper surface of the wing. . The main electrical loom in forward section of wing was cut causing loss of engine control (thrust ok) on No 1 and no ability to shut it down with Fire Handle. . The power drive unit for the leading edge devices was severed in the same location, . The crew were unable to discharge any fire bottles for engine No 1 and No 2. . All electrical hydraulic pumps that side were lost. . A piece of rotor penetrated the body fairing and severed a wiring loom in that location. . Another piece of the rotor damaged the aft fuel transfer gallery and caused leaks in the left mid and inner fuel feed tanks - one of which was substantial. This led to a lateral imbalance problem. . The crew were unable to jettison or transfer fuel forward. This led to indications of an aft cg problem. . Emergency Outer tank transfer only resulted in the right hand outer tank transferring - the left hand tank failed to transfer - this helped the lateral imbalance. . There was damage to the fairing housing the RAT, flaps and flap track fairings. . Total loss of the Green hydraulic system, . ECAM indicated loss of both electrical hydraulic pumps on No 4 engine (Yellow system). . Landing Gear required gravity extension. . No anti skid on wing gear hence only emergency brakes; body gear braking normal . Engines 1 and 4 indicating 'degraded mode' - which means no N-1 rating limit. Requires all engines to be switched to 'Alternate' mode with a 4% maximum thrust loss. . AC bus 1&2 failed. . No 2 engine electrical generator failed as a result of the engine failure . The APU was started but the crew were unable to connect the APU bleed air or the generators to the bus system. . No 1 air conditioning pack failed. . Autothrust was not available. . The satellite phone system would not work. ECAM Management: When the failure occurred something like 54 ECAM messages appeared on the screen. These set off the Master Warning and Master Caution many times; to the point of distraction of the crew. The First Office started the stop watch when the first master warning went off and from there it took the crew 50 minutes or so to clear the messages down to the Status page. Management of the ECAM was an issue with the ECAM calling for a transfer of fuel into obviously leaking tanks to cure a fuel imbalance. Forward transfer was also not possible which generated an ECAM for an aft CG problem that could not be rectified. The ECAM also called for a Fuel Quantity Management System reset which, when carried out, regenerated all the error messages. For non - Airbus pilots the Status page is normally where ECAM actions are stopped and Normal checklists are used, Operational Engineering Bulletins are considered, resets to recover systems are attempted and any pilot initiated abnormal checklists are used. Preparation for Landing: It took the crew some time to prepare the aircraft for landing. The Landing Performance Application of the Electronic Flight Bag did not appear to generate correct information which resulted in the crew carefully entering eight landing alerts and recalculating the landing performance. The end result was that the predicted approach speed was around 167 knots and landing distance 3850 meters on the 4000 meter runway. Aircraft handling checks were carried out in both the clean and landing configuration with adequate control response and margin demonstrated. This was despite a lateral imbalance of around 10 tonnes and a message indicating an aft cg issue. Landing: Given the loss of hydraulics the aircraft was in a degraded mode with only one aileron working on one wing and two on the other with limited spoiler capability. Autothrust was not available and manual thrust was used with the engines in the alternate mode. Also no leading edge slats were available and the gear had to be extended by gravity. Despite this the approach to landing went as planned expect for a "Speed, Speed" call by the warning system. The reason for this is unknown but it was cancelled by thrust application. Touchdown was reported as very smooth and the aircraft speed was brought under control with about 600 metres to run. The aircraft was allowed to roll near to the end runway to position it near the fire trucks. When the aircraft finally stopped the brake temperatures quickly rose to 900 degrees and a few tires deflated. Post landing: When the aircraft stopped the crew attempted to shut down the No 1 engine but were unable to do so with either the fuel switch or the engine fire handle. Fuel was leaking from the left hand wing and pooling around the hot brakes. The fire crew were organized to smother the fuel with foam and the decision was made not to evacuate the aircraft given the running engine, the pooling fuel, the potential for serious injuries and the presence of the fire crews who were attempting to stop the No 1 engine by running a stream of water down the intake. When the engines were finally shut down the aircraft went "dark" due to the inability to connect the APU generators to the bus system.. ------------------------------------------------------ Issues for Consideration: This event raises a number of issues for consideration by the ADO committee, Rolls Royce, Airbus and the industry in general. There is no doubt that the aircraft was badly damaged by the IP rotor burst. In fact, it is fortunate that this incident did not end up like the DC-10 in Sioux City Iowa [Or American at O'Hare]. >From an aircraft damage tolerance point of view it is a tribute to the A380, modern design criteria and the redundancy available later generation aircraft. Certainly the fact that the very experienced crew consisted of three Captains, a highly experienced First Officer and a very experienced ex-military Second Officer enabled tasks to be shared including flying the aircraft, dealing with the huge amount of ECAM messages, communication and performance calculations. The First Officer managed the ECAM and, at times, decisions were made to ignore or not do certain ECAM procedures that did not seem logical such as transferring fuel into leaking tanks. It is worth noting that there were three captains present because the Pilot-in-Command was being Annual Route checked by a trainee Check Captain who was being supervised by another Check Captain. Without going into significant explanatory detail the following poses the following questions for consideration: Design: . Given this and a number of other uncontained turbine rotor failures should transport category aircraft be designed to withstand an engine rotor burst? Or is this impracticable? . Conversely, is it possible to design for rotor containment or mitigation by the engine in the event of a burst? . Can engine monitoring systems be developed to warn of an impending catastrophic failure? (e.g. a combination of vibration/ rapid core temperature changes/parameters out of limits) . Rolls Royce have mentioned engine self protection systems to shut down engines in order to minimise the effect of a rotor burst. How would that be implemented? Would warning be given? How critical would an unexpected shutdown be? What would the false warning rate be? . Why did some apparently unrelated systems fail in this incident? (e.g. Yellow system hydraulic pumps on engine No 4) Is there a common data management source that is failing under overload or was it damaged in the incident? . Are modern aircraft so complex that failures tend to be multi-modal and thus confusing to the crew? . If an electrical loom to an engine is cut the fail safe mode is to run on. What if the engine runs on at high thrust? . If there had been an engine fire the crew would not have been able to use the fire bottles because of the cut loom. Is this system truly redundant and effective? . Given the loss of systems in the wing should the main electrical loom be relocated or systems separated to a secondary loom to improve redundancy? . The crew were unable to transfer fuel and there was a substantial fuel leak from the left wing. What if these failures had occurred in mid ocean? Operational Philosophy: . There were many ECAM messages occurring in the initial failure. The constant alerts were distracting and the need to cancel them detracted from the procedures.. Should a semi-permanent cancel mode be available? The crew know they have a problem. . Did the ECAM correctly prioritise the alerts? Probably not known at this stage but certainly a few ECAM messages appeared incorrect in the circumstances (e.g. Fuel transfer into leaking tanks for imbalance). . Is the modern trend to complete all ECAM/EICAS actions too time consuming and distracting to the crew to the detriment of prioritising the flying of the aircraft and the landing? . Should there be an abbreviated ECAM/EICAS procedure that achieves a safe mode for landing in the event of an emergency return? . Is modern aircraft operational philosophy too automation and functional system reliant? Training and Experience: . This was highly experienced crew. Should this type of failure be considered when pairing a 240 hour MPL or cadet pilot graduate with a relatively new Captain? Or is the probability too remote and thus acceptable? . The crew reported in this case that crew resource management was very effective and that there was zero cockpit gradient. The crew were adaptive in dealing with the multiple and complicated ECAM messages. Should crew resource training be modified to include crew recognition of the extreme nature of the emergency and thus to not slavishly follow checklist procedures to the detriment of a timely return to landing? . Given the move to evidence based training should training scenarios include multi-mode failures so that crews can cope with unusual events or are they so rare as not to warrant this type of training? Conclusion: This incident could easily have been an accident; many of the systems failures the crew had to deal with would be classed as an emergency on their own (e.g. uncontained engine failure, loss of hydraulics, multiple bus failures and leading edge failure) let alone in combination. The fact that it wasn't an accident is probably testament to the redundancy built into the A380 design and it is certainly due to the training and competency of a very experienced crew operating in a team environment. There are many positive lessons to be learned from this event. Captain Richard Woodward Executive Vice President Technical Standards IFALPA




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